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COMMERCE IN THE COMMONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
NATURAL CAPITAL REGULATION UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Blake Hudson*
Scholars continue to debate the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and
whether fluctuations in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
place federal environmental regulatory authority at risk.  Yet when one analyzes
major Commerce Clause cases involving resource regulation since the beginning of
the modern regulatory state, a consistent theme emerges: both the Supreme Court
and Circuit Courts of Appeals have consistently upheld federal authority to regulate
depletable natural resources, the appropriation of which is non-excludable — key
characteristics of a commons.  Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be interpreted
as treating appropriation of this natural capital, here described as “privatized com-
mons resources,” as fundamentally meeting the third test for determining the validity
of federal legislation under the Commerce Clause — the “substantial effects” test.
Using commons analysis to meet the substantial effects test has the potential to pro-
vide a unified theory of federal environmental regulatory authority under the Com-
merce Clause, a clearer statement of the jurisprudential approach in environmental
cases, and more certainty and effectiveness in environmental and natural resources
legislation.  Commons analysis also assists in answering persistent questions arising
in Commerce Clause cases, including when the “aggregation principle” may be in-
voked to find substantial effects on interstate commerce, what the “object of regula-
tion” is in environmental Commerce Clause cases, and what the proper scope of
federal Commerce Clause authority is given constitutional federalism limitations.
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Simply closing the boundaries [of a resource system] is not
enough.  It is still possible for a limited number of appropriators to
increase the quantity of resource units they harvest so that they . . .
totally destroy the resource.  Consequently, in addition to closing
the boundaries, some rules limiting appropriation and/or mandat-
ing provision are needed.1
- Elinor Ostrom
I. INTRODUCTION
The “tragedy of the commons”2 is perhaps the primary theoretical
driver behind government regulation of the environment, while the Com-
merce Clause is the primary tool used by the federal government to enact
environmental and natural resource regulation.  Even so, scholars have yet to
apply a commons analysis to Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  This is a
significant oversight, especially given the persistent questions scholars have
raised regarding what the “new federalism” introduced in United States v.
Lopez3 and United States v. Morrison,4 as well as the subsequent rejection of
federalism limits in Gonzales v. Raich,5 means for federal environmental
legislation.6  These concerns justifiably result from the varied and often con-
fused rationales provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Commerce Clause
cases, which have in turn resulted in confusion in the lower courts.  Yet a
1 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 92 (1990) (citation omitted).
2 Garrett Hardin’s essay of the same name, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968), is one of the most cited policy articles of our time. KARLSON “CHARLIE” HARGROVES
& MICHAEL H. SMITH, THE NATURAL ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS: BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES,
INNOVATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 178 (2005).
3 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
4 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
5 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
6 See infra note 45. R
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constant theme has emerged from Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Courts
have consistently upheld federal authority to regulate depletable natural re-
sources, the appropriation of which is non-excludable — key attributes of a
commons.  This Article describes this depletable “natural capital”7 as
“privatized commons resources.”8  Traditional commons analysis provides a
useful method for assessing how the distribution, appropriation, and con-
sumption of these resources affect commercial and economic activity across
state lines — i.e., “interstate commerce” — and for determining when fed-
eral environmental regulation is constitutional.
Drawing on insights from renowned commons scholar Elinor Ostrom9
and Tragedy of the Commons author Garrett Hardin, among others, this Arti-
cle provides a new lens through which to view environmental and natural
resources jurisprudence: a lens that introduces a clearer, more consistent ap-
proach for the treatment of resource regulation under the Commerce Clause.
By applying principles arising out of Ostrom’s conception of commons re-
sources, we can see that courts have consistently treated appropriation of
privatized commons resources as meeting the “substantial effects test” for
determining the validity of federal legislation under the Commerce Clause.10
Use of commons analysis to identify the boundaries of the substantial effects
test (1) provides a long overdue, unified justification for federal environmen-
tal regulatory authority; (2) articulates a clearer statement of the jurispruden-
tial approach in federal environmental cases; (3) allows uniform application
7 “Natural capital” includes “all the familiar resources used by humankind: water, miner-
als, oil, trees, fish, soil, air, et cetera.  But it also encompasses living systems, which include
grasslands, savannas, wetlands, estuaries, oceans, coral reefs, riparian corridors, tundras, and
rainforests.” PAUL HAWKEN, AMORY LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS, NATURAL CAPITALISM:
CREATING THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 2 (1999).
The term “natural capital”. . . is based on a more functional definition of capital as
‘a stock that yields a flow of valuable goods or services into the future.’. . . [A] stock
or population of trees or fish provides a flow or annual yield of new trees or fish, a
flow that can be sustainable year after year.  The sustainable flow is ‘natural income’;
the stock that yields the sustainable flow is ‘natural capital.’  Natural capital may also
provide services such as recycling waste materials, or water catchment and erosion
control, which are also counted as natural income.  Since the flow of services from
ecosystems requires that they function as whole systems, the structure and diversity
of the system is an important component in natural capital.
Robert Costanza & Herman E. Daly, Natural Capital and Sustainable Development, 6 CON-
SERVATION BIOLOGY 37, 38 (1992). In addition, “natural capital” and “natural income” are
“aggregates  of  natural  resources  in  their  separate  stock  and  flow  dimensions. . . .” Id.
8 This Article uses the term “privatized commons resources” to describe two categories of
resources: (1) natural resources contained on land (wetlands, endangered species, or other re-
sources that constitute natural capital) that are appropriated by economic development (retail,
housing, industrial, agricultural, etc.) and (2) resources appropriated by individuals and tied to
an interstate market (wheat, marijuana, or other resources that constitute natural capital com-
modities).  This term is only a term of art meant to describe natural resources that, though
privatized, take on the characteristics of commons resources, and to which commons analysis
can be applied.
9 2009 Nobel Prize recipient in Economic Sciences.
10 See infra Part V.A.
30325_hle_35-2 Sheet No. 60 Side B      07/29/2011   14:15:42
30325_hle_35-2 Sheet No. 60 Side B      07/29/2011   14:15:42
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE202.txt unknown Seq: 4 15-JUL-11 15:18
378 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35
of judicial standards in lower courts currently divided over how to apply
Commerce Clause analysis to federal statutes;11 and (4) introduces more cer-
tainty and effectiveness into environmental and natural resources legislation.
Commons analysis also assists in answering persistent questions arising in
Commerce Clause cases, including when the “aggregation principle”12 may
be invoked to find substantial effects on interstate commerce; what the “ob-
ject of regulation”13 is in environmental Commerce Clause cases; and what
the proper scope of federal Commerce Clause authority is given constitu-
tional federalism limitations.
In particular, using a commons analysis to describe the scope of the
Commerce Clause provides a stronger protection of federalism principles
than the comprehensive scheme approach arguably adopted by the Raich
Court.14 Lopez, Morrison, and Raich were quite consistent in at least one
aspect — they each upheld prior Commerce Clause cases finding that intra-
state economic activities could be aggregated and regulated as substantially
affecting interstate commerce.15  Though the Court’s broad definition of “ec-
onomic” in Raich has been criticized as open-ended and incapable of pro-
viding any meaningful judicial defense of federalism principles,16 the
requirement that the intrastate activity be economic in nature provides more
robust federalism protections than the Raich Court’s supposed alternative
“comprehensive scheme” holding.17  The former test is superior to the latter
from a federalism perspective and commons analysis provides a meaningful
method for determining when an intrastate activity is truly economic in na-
ture, as privatized commons resources make up an inherently aggregated
11 See infra note 264 and accompanying text. R
12 See infra note 168 and accompanying text. R
13 Bradford Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act Constitutional
Under the Commerce Clause? 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 403 (2007) [hereinafter Mank, After
Gonzales v. Raich].
14 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
15 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 449, 559–60 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 611 (2000); Raich, 545 U.S. at 9.  In Raich, Justice Stevens, while attempting to
present a coherent picture of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, stated “[o]ur case law firmly
establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  545 U.S. at 17.
16 See Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 763–64 (2005); Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism:
Clear Statement Rules After Gonzales v. Raich, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113, 118 (2006).
The Raich Court stated that:
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are
quintessentially economic. “Economics” refers to “the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 720
(1966).  The CSA is a statute that regulates the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate
market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of com-
merce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that
product.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–26.
17 See, e.g., infra note 290 and accompanying text. R
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economic system.  As such, what is good for federalism in this regard is also
— perhaps ironically — good for the environment, since commons analysis
can provide both meaningful federalism protections and a clearer justifica-
tion for federal environmental legislation under the Commerce Clause.
With state governments challenging the validity of the contentious 2010
health care bill as beyond Congress’s commerce power,18 and with a diverse
set of new justices added to the Supreme Court — from Justice Roberts and
his arguably flippant opinion of the “hapless toad”19 to the presumably more
environmentally friendly appointees of the Obama administration — the
scope of the Commerce Clause will continue to be defined in the coming
years.  For a judicial system based upon establishing stability in the law,
adherence to stare decisis, and steadfast submission to a document written
over 200 years ago, jurisprudence and scholarship regarding the scope of
federal environmental authority under the Commerce Clause have been any-
thing but stable.  This Article seeks to calm the waters by demonstrating that
in the era of the modern regulatory state, courts have consistently upheld
federal regulatory protection of privatized commons resources, and have,
perhaps unknowingly, defined the scope of the Commerce Clause to include
such resources as validly subject to federal regulation because of their sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.20
This Article applies principles arising from the commons theoretical
framework to Commerce Clause jurisprudence in order to formulate a new,
unified test for determining the validity of federal environmental regulation
under the Commerce Clause.  Part II provides necessary background on the
tragedy of the commons and the tensions in our governance system that give
18 As of January 18, 2011, twenty-seven states have challenged the health care bill in
court, including Florida, Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Virginia, Arizona, Indiana,
Mississippi, Nevada and North Dakota. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Legis-
lation and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2010–11, http://www.ncsl.org/?
tabid=18906 (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).  Also, as of February 2011 “at least 40 state legisla-
tures proposed legislation to limit, alter or oppose selected state or federal actions” under the
bill, and “[i]n 30 of the states, the filed measures include a proposed constitutional amend-
ment by ballot question . . . . In at least 16 states proposed bills aimed to amend state law, not
the state constitution.” Id.
19 In Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003), plaintiff developers brought
suit against the federal government for application of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”),
which halted construction of the development in order to protect the listed Arroyo Toad.  A
panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the application of the ESA.  Then-Judge
Roberts dissented in a denial of a rehearing en banc, arguing that the decision should be recon-
sidered in light of Lopez and Morrison.  Roberts expressed doubt that the regulation of “a
hapless toad, that, for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating
‘Commerce . . . among the several states.’” Id. at 1160 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
20 For an environmental economics discussion on why environmental statutes should be
understood as a response to market failures of various types generally (briefly introducing the
commons concept as one such failure), and thus appropriately regulable under the Commerce
Clause, see Mollie Lee, Environmental Economics: A Market Failure Approach to the Com-
merce Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456 (2006).  This Article does not address market failures glob-
ally, but instead focuses specifically on applying commons analysis to the Commerce Clause.
30325_hle_35-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      07/29/2011   14:15:42
30325_hle_35-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      07/29/2011   14:15:42
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE202.txt unknown Seq: 6 15-JUL-11 15:18
380 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35
rise to environmental regulatory controversies.  Part III describes how pri-
vate property, though touted as a potential solution for commons problems,
can nonetheless entrench commons tragedies when natural capital on private
land is appropriated for economic development (through change in use of the
land itself) or is subject to market forces (when commodity resources are
cultivated from land).  This Part primarily utilizes the lens of land develop-
ment21 to demonstrate under what circumstances the regulatory object of fed-
eral environmental statutes passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause may be
considered privatized commons resources.  Part IV scales up the analysis
from Part III to describe state governments as “rational herders” within the
“pastoral commons” of the United States, and discusses how intrastate mar-
kets provide jurisprudential reasoning for a certain level of federal regula-
tory authority over the environment under the Commerce Clause.  Part V
discusses the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the area
of privatized commons resources, how the Court has consistently upheld
federal regulation of such resources, and how commons analysis answers the
“aggregation,” “object of the regulation,” and “scope of federal authority”
questions arising in Commerce Clause cases.  Part VI briefly concludes.
II. COMMONS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE – BACKGROUND
AND CONTEXT
Garrett Hardin’s often-cited “tragedy of the commons” scenario de-
scribes herders entering a pasture open to all other herders, i.e., a “com-
mons.”22 When considering the natural resource available to the group, each
herder, being “rational,” attempts to maximize personal gain by undertaking
a simple cost-benefit analysis.  Each herder receives the entire positive bene-
fit for every additional animal the herder brings onto the commons; the more
animals a herder owns, the greater the overall economic value of that
herder’s flock.  However, the negative cost of overgrazing created by each
additional animal is shared by the entire group of herders in the pasture.  As
such, the individual herder only suffers a fractional share of the overall nega-
tive cost that accrues to the group.23  As a result, through a cost-benefit anal-
ysis, the herder determines that:
[T]he only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another
animal to his herd.  And another; and another . . . . But this is the
conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing
the commons.  Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is locked into a
21 This Article uses the term “development” (or “developer”) to include a variety of de-
velopment activities that are economic in nature and driven by market forces, including, but
not necessarily limited to, commercial, retail, housing, industrial, and agricultural
development.
22 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
23 Id.
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system that compels him to increase his herd without limit — in a
world that is limited . . .  Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all.24
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all because in a finite world of finite
resources, unchecked consumption can ultimately lead to dire consequences
for the society reliant on those resources.  Hardin provides many modern
examples of commons in which this tragedy has the potential to occur, such
as national parks, grazing lands, fish stocks, pollution in the atmosphere, and
even parking meters.25  Hardin also highlights various solutions that might
address the tragedy of the commons, including the creation of a private prop-
erty rights system, implementation of “polluter pays” principles, and
regulation.26
In the United States, each of Hardin’s suggested solutions is used in
some capacity to forestall identified “tragedies” of many kinds, particularly
regarding the environment.  Two of Hardin’s solutions, however, have come
into sharp conflict with one another, as the modern federal regulatory state
has increasingly clashed with private property rights, as well as with state
regulatory authority.  The primary constitutional provision under which the
federal government regulates the environment is the Commerce Clause,27
while the primary regulators of private property rights and land use are state
and local governments.28  The resulting conflict among private property
owners, state governments, and the federal government is one of the most
pronounced illustrations of federalism-based legal controversies.  The exis-
tence of this controversy is perhaps best evidenced by numerous scholarly
works and court opinions debating whether certain applications of environ-
mental statutes — with arguably tenuous ties to interstate commerce — are,
or will remain, constitutional under the Supreme Court’s modern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.  Perhaps the most emblematic of all federal environ-
mental statutes in this regard is the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), the
federal statute that most directly interferes with state control over private
property and land use regulation.  Private property owners have argued that
wholly intrastate species that have little or no economic value are not prop-
erly regulable by the federal government under the Commerce Clause.29
Even so, analysis of major Commerce Clause cases involving federal
resource regulation since the beginning of the modern regulatory state, i.e.,
since Wickard v. Filburn,30 demonstrates that courts have consistently upheld
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1245.
26 Id.
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28 See infra Part IV.
29 See, e.g., Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty Invest-
ments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt,
130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  Nearly half of all species listed as endangered or threatened
under the ESA have habitats limited to one state.  Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note
13, at 428. R
30 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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federal authority to regulate a certain class of environmental resources, and
specifically a modified form of commons resource, which this Article de-
scribes as privatized commons resources.31  From wheat,32 to minerals,33 to
marijuana,34 to wetlands,35 to endangered species,36 courts have consistently
validated federal regulatory authority over these depletable37 natural re-
sources, the appropriation of which is non-excludable — the key characteris-
tics of a commons.38  These privatized commons resources include two
categories of resources: (1) natural resources contained on land (wetlands,
endangered species, or other natural capital) that are appropriated by eco-
nomic development (retail, housing, industrial, agricultural, etc.) and (2) re-
sources appropriated by individuals and tied to an interstate market (wheat,
marijuana, or other natural capital commodities).
The cases of United States v. Lopez39 and United States v. Morrison40
had been credited with ushering into the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence a new era of federalism-based protections — the “new feder-
alism”41 — as they were the first cases since 1937 in which the Supreme
Court struck down federal statutes as beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause.42  This theory was soon put to the test when, in Gonzales v. Raich,43
the Court upheld a federal statute regulating wholly intrastate activities with
an arguably tenuous connection to interstate commerce.44  These cases have
caused quite a stir amongst scholars, who have written a flurry of articles
questioning their implications for environmental regulation.  Scholars have
expressed, at the least, criticism for the apparent lack of consistency in the
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and at the most concern about
31 See supra note 8. R
32 Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
33 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
34 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
35 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
36 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
37 The term “depletable” here is used in a temporal sense, in that at any chosen point in
time when a commons resource is appropriated it is depletable, though the resource may in-
deed be replenished in the future.  Professor Daniels has noted that the primary requirement for
a resource to be considered a part of a commons is that “appropriation of the commons re-
source results in a diminishing stock of the resource base.”  Brigham Daniels, Governing the
Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L. REV. 899, 908 (2010) [hereinafter Daniels,
Presidential Nomination] (emphasis added).  Stated differently, “[a] consumptive use does
not necessarily permanently diminish the amount of a commons resource available, but it di-
minishes opportunities for rival users at least for a time.” Id. at 906.
38 See, e.g., Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L.
515, 523–24 (2007) [hereinafter Daniels, Emerging Commons]; see infra notes 54–57. R
39 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
40 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
41 See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 403, 408 (2003).
42 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 101, 101 (2001).
43 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
44 Id. at 59 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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whether Lopez and Morrison placed environmental statutes in danger of be-
ing invalidated on the one hand or whether Raich magically erased those
concerns in one fell swoop on the other.45  Other scholars have claimed that
in the instant that Raich came to the rescue of past and future environmental
legislation it also crushed the hopes of federalists for a resurgence in “new
federalism” jurisprudence.46
The alarmism over both the potential evisceration of federal environ-
mental statutes and the supposed death knell to judicial federalism protec-
tions in Commerce Clause cases47 seems hyperbolic when one views
Commerce Clause jurisprudence through the lens of the commons.  Upon
doing so, an argument emerges that courts have consistently treated priva-
tized commons resources as meeting the substantial effects test for determin-
ing the validity of federal legislation under the Commerce Clause.48  The
“new federalism” cases of Lopez and Morrison did not involve the regula-
45 See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743
(2005); Eric Brignac, The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endangered Species Pro-
tection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 883 (2001); Eric Claeys, Raich and Judicial
Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005);
Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United States
v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605 (2001); Dan Gildor, Preserving
the Priceless: A Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and
Promote the Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821 (2005); Christine A. Klein, The Environmen-
tal Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38 (2003); Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich,
supra note 13; Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endan- R
gered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the
Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735–36 (2002); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Fu-
ture of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 844–46 (2003); Thomas
W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 823, 844 (2005); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998); Sarah D. Van Loh, The Latest and
Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and
GDF Realty, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459 (2004); Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United
States v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321 (1997);
Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis
Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235 (2000); Ernest
A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales
v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
46 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 16, at 752–53; Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, R
Gonzalez v. Raich [sic], the “Comprehensive Scheme” Principle, and the Constitutionality of
the Endangered Species Act, 35 ENVTL. L. 491, 494–98 (2005) [hereinafter Blumm & Kim-
brell, Comprehensive Scheme].
47 One scholar has stated that “[j]ust as many scholars prematurely heralded Lopez as the
beginning of a Commerce Clause revolution, others now may be too quick to characterize
Raich as the end.”  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause
Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 884 (2005).
48 “Commons” here is defined narrowly.  Certainly there may be commons that are
outside the scope of economic activity and “commerce.”  Natural capital, however, is perhaps
the prototypical example of a commons resource, being the first category of commons identi-
fied, and invokes economic activity and economic analysis.  The arguments put forth in this
Article, therefore, are concerned only with this “baseline” of commons resources, meaning
that though other commons resources may meet the substantial effects test under the Com-
merce Clause, and thus are regulable by the federal government under this analysis, at the very
least certain environmental and natural resources meet that test.
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tion of zero-sum49 commons resources, but rather the regulation of non-zero-
sum social constructs.  The regulated activities in those cases — the carrying
of guns near school zones and domestic violence — are socially constructed
problems consisting of individualized decision-making exercised indepen-
dently of the decisions of other individuals making the same choices.  Such
decisions do not constitute a commons, as these decisions are infinite within
the social construct — thus the Court did not allow their “aggregation” for
the purpose of determining substantial effects on interstate commerce.  Com-
mons problems, on the other hand, are best characterized as “naturally con-
structed” problems consisting of individualized decision-making that
necessarily affects the consumptive activities of others as well as the total
stock of the natural resource base — making aggregation under the substan-
tial effects test quite appropriate.  Furthermore, the statutes in Lopez and
Morrison focused on public safety and security, which may best be charac-
terized as “public goods” rather than a commons, since public safety is non-
depletable and non-exclusive.50  Therefore, the effects on interstate com-
merce are arguably more amorphous, and thus federalism protections more
appropriate, in the context of the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison.  In
the context of natural resources and the environment, however, a commons
analysis renders the substantial effects test more readily met.
Since individualized decisions regarding the use of commons resources
necessarily affect the use decisions of other individuals, as well as the
amount and value of resources available to others, regardless of the arbitrary
geopolitical boundaries that may or may not divide them, it follows naturally
that courts would more easily find that these activities transcend the geopo-
litical boundary and “commerce” thresholds that form the foundation for
application of the Commerce Clause.  Indeed, by widening the scale of our
commons analysis we can see that the states themselves — through their
primary control over land use regulation — may act as the rational herders
that Hardin describes, and the “environment” stretching from coast to coast
becomes the “pastoral commons” consumed in the aggregate by the states,
largely with a view toward economic development.
Though the commons nature of commodities for which a consumptive
interstate market is established may be more apparent — such as for wheat,
minerals, and, after Raich, marijuana — commons principles are equally
applicable to other privatized commons resources, such as wetlands and en-
dangered species appropriated by economic development activities.  The
growing body of scholarship on ecosystem services, which demonstrates the
49 “Zero-sum” here is used to mean “of, relating to, or being a situation . . . in which a
gain for one side entails a corresponding loss for the other side.” WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1371 (1989).
50 See OSTROM, supra note 1, at 32 (stating that “one’s consumption of public security R
does not reduce the general level of security available in a community” and noting more
generally that “propositions derived from a theory of public goods that are based on the non-
subtractive attributes of those goods are not applicable to an analysis of appropriation and use
of subtractable resource units”); Lee, supra note 20, at 479, 483, 487–88. R
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economic internalization of externalities long excluded from market-based
decision-making regarding the management and use of natural resources,
supports this assertion.51  When viewed through the lens of the commons,
Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be characterized as judicial recognition
and internalization of those externalities by acknowledging that the appropri-
ation of privatized commons resources is an economic activity having a
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce to the degree required to consti-
tutionally allow federal action under the Commerce Clause.  This proposi-
tion becomes clearer upon adjustment of the scale of analysis, as we come to
understand how the private property rights system that supposedly fences in
natural capital and commons resources to allow better management may
function exactly like a commons, with all the attendant potential tragedies
included.
III. THE TRAGEDY OF LANDED NATURAL CAPITAL AS PRIVATIZED
COMMONS RESOURCES
Though Hardin’s influential work on the commons detailed a narrow set
of resources considered commons in nature, with the associated tragedies of
overuse and degradation, scholars have since expanded that set.  The list
now includes not only traditional natural resources, but also “new com-
mons” in the form of medical care,52 parking spots, sidewalk vending,
knowledge, government budgets, silence, email inboxes, and even presiden-
tial primaries.53  Both traditional and new commons resources may be sub-
51 See James Salzman, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law, in MAN-
AGING HUMAN DOMINATED ECOSYSTEMS 77 (Victoria Hollowell ed., 2001); James Salzman,
Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Eco-
nomics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); James Salzman, Creating Markets for
Ecosystem Services: Notes From the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005); James Salzman, A
Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133
(2006).  Externalities adversely affect optimal market outcomes because they occur when
some of the costs or benefits of an activity are not borne by the party engaging in the activity.
See TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 46–49 (4th ed.
1996). “There is significant scientific evidence that many endangered or threatened species
that possess little commercial value perform critical ‘ecosystem services’ such as decomposing
organic matter, renewing soil, mitigating floods, purifying air and water, or partially stabilizing
climatic variation.” Bradford Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species
Under the Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits Over Whether the Regulated Activity Is
Private Commercial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923,
989–90 (2004) [hereinafter Mank, Split in the Circuits]  (citing John Charles Kunich, Preserv-
ing the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149,
1164–65 (2001)).
52 Michael Gochfeld, Joanna Burger, & Bernard D. Goldstein, Medical Care as a Com-
mons, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS 253, 253 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001).
53 Daniels, Presidential Nomination, supra note 37, at 907.  Professor Daniels has noted R
that:
New commons resources are new in one of two respects.  First, they might be con-
sidered new in that, like an e-mail inbox, they are a fairly recent invention.  Second,
they might be familiar but only recently categorized as a commons resource, as in
the case of silence or knowledge.
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ject to one form of tragedy of the commons “solution” or another, such as
property rights or regulation.  Even so, these commons remain subject to
potential tragedy because those “solutions” are imperfect.  Ultimately,
privatization of a commons, for example, may not remove all of the com-
mons attributes that can lead to destruction of the resource.  Such is the case
with natural capital either removed from land by economic development ac-
tivities or cultivated from land, even in the presence of a property rights
system.  The goal of this Part and Part IV is to demonstrate that once we
consider privatized commons resources as a “new commons” we can begin
to see how their regulation by the federal government may be found consti-
tutional under the Commerce Clause’s substantial effects test since they form
an inherently aggregated economic system.
The most notable commons scholars of our time provide a consistent
description of commons resources, and these are the parameters within
which this Article argues privatized commons resources are included.  Rob-
ert Keohane and Elinor Ostrom define commons resources as “depletable
natural or human-made resources from which potential beneficiaries are dif-
ficult to exclude.”54  Oran Young similarly describes a commons resource as
“a resource used by a group of appropriators that is both non-excludable and
depletable.”55  Duncan Snidal asserts that commons analysis “focuses on the
provision and appropriation of goods that are not joint in consumption (like
private goods) but where exclusion is difficult (like public goods).  Standard
cases are natural resources, like forests or water, where the quantity availa-
ble is less than the desired consumption of potential appropriators.”56
Steven Hackett and his coauthors maintain this consistent theme, arguing
that commons resources are “natural or human-made resources in which (a)
exclusion is non-trivial (but not necessarily impossible) and (b) yield is
subtractable.”57
In sum, a commons consists of depletable resources where it is difficult
to exclude appropriators seeking to consume those resources.  As demon-
strated below, the natural capital that exists on private lands is depletable
and developers are very difficult to exclude from appropriating that natural
capital, whether the developer is an individual property owner undertaking
Id. This Article argues that certain environmental resources over which the federal govern-
ment claims Commerce Clause authority constitute yet another “new commons,” in the form
of “privatized commons resources.”
54 Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL
INTERDEPENDENCE 1, 13 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995).
55 Oran R. Young, The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships, in LOCAL
COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 27, 29 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
1995).
56 Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institu-
tions, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 47, 50 (Robert O. Keohane &
Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995).
57 Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley & James Walker, Heterogeneities, Information and Con-
flict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts, in LOCAL COMMONS AND
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 93, 95 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995).
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development activities or selling the property to another who is in the busi-
ness of development.  Similarly, resources extracted from land by individu-
als, such as agricultural products (wheat, marijuana), are depletable, and it is
very difficult to exclude individuals from consuming and impacting markets
related to those resources.  Because the regulation of wetlands, endangered
species, wheat, marijuana, minerals, and other resources is the focus of the
foundational Commerce Clause cases relating to the environment, it is nec-
essary to explore how these resources may be characterized as privatized
commons resources.
A. Adjusting the Scale of Analysis – Natural Capital on Private
Property Subject to Economic Development or Markets Is a Commons
It is unlikely that private property rights as a solution to commons
problems is the absolute failure that some may claim.58  The system of pri-
vate property rights embedded in modern U.S. society can provide numerous
environmental benefits, if those in control of the property act in an environ-
mentally responsible manner.  Numerous environmental non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) and private individuals have used the vehicle of
private property rights to purchase or receive donations of property for the
sole purpose of conserving environmental amenities.59  Others, through the
vehicle of ecosystem services, have struck a balance between protecting the
environment and facilitating economic revenues and progress.  These parties
58 See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property
Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 538 (2007) (“[A]ll this talk about private property and
market regimes generating an alternative to government regulation of environmental problems
is in fact nothing more than a mirage.”).
59 See Bill Finch, Deal Preserves More Forest Land, MOBILE PRESS REGISTER, Mar. 29,
2006, at A1; Greg Fales, IP Donates 2,650 Acres in Mississippi to the Conservation Fund,
PIMA’S PAPERMAKER, Apr. 1999, at 10.  Professor Sinden does not find comfort in this potenti-
ality, arguing that market availability for the protection of some land and resources does not
mean that markets are the best or most efficient mechanisms for doing so. Sinden, supra note
58, at 598–99.  Just because conservation is not at its maximum efficiency, however, does not R
mean that the private property rights system facilitating the choice and means of engaging in
conservation is a failure.  The question turns more on individual choice and cultural ethics —
and as society moves toward a place closer to Leopold’s “land ethic,” with greater education
and recognition of its dependency on the environment and natural resources, there is great
potential to be tapped in the power of private conservation. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND
COUNTY ALMANAC 237–64 (Ballantine Books 1970) (1949).  This trend toward a greater land
ethic may already be taking place, as conservation efforts on private lands and incentives for
undertaking such conservation activities have greatly increased this decade. See Press Release,
Land Trust Alliance, Private Land Conservation in U.S. Soars (Nov. 30, 2006), http://
www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/news/alliance-news/private-land-conservation-in-u.s.-
soars (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).  Regardless, this Article is not arguing for private conserva-
tion as the only means of conservation, or that without some balance with government-im-
posed limits it would be successful.  Private property rights can, however, be a powerful tool
for conservation, especially in instilling in future generations the important concept of a volun-
tary land ethic.  As we see quite often in the marketplace, including the marketplace of ideas,
true choice can often lead to better results. See, e.g., John A. Baden, Kelo’s Consequences for
Conservation, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., Aug. 16, 2005, available at http://www.bozeman
dailychronicle.com/opinions/article_07dd0217-3bda-5cec-a24a-9de1b421c178.html.
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have captured the services provided by ecosystems within markets, and by
doing so have gained economic return simply from protecting natural
capital.60
Ultimately, a judicially protected private property rights system is nec-
essary if for no other reason than the following exercise in logic: the very
same legal system that may protect one person’s right to pave an asphalt
parking lot over 100 acres of pristine forestland preserves another person’s
right to conserve the same 100 acres in perpetuity.  Without a robust private
property rights system, and with property rights existing only at the discre-
tion of the government, serious environmental problems can arise.  The fore-
most of these is that a democratically elected majority, unsympathetic to
conservation interests and wishing to rejuvenate a suffering economy by in-
vesting in sprawling development, might vote to transfer 100 acres of pris-
tine forest from the person wishing to conserve the forest to the person
wishing to develop a “big box” retail store, or may vote to condemn prop-
erty for a downtown redevelopment centered around a private pharmaceuti-
cal company, as in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Kelo v. City of
New London.61
Hence it is clear that a system of private property rights can serve not
only individual interests, but also important societal and environmental in-
terests.  This system only works properly as a solution to the tragedy of the
commons, however, when it is driven by individuals who exercise environ-
mental responsibility in the management of their private lands by not taking
on the characteristics of rational herders, or, as this Article argues, “rational
private property owners.”  The purpose of providing private property rights
in commons resources is to turn rational individual decisions that lead to
irrational collective harms into rational collective outcomes.  Stated differ-
ently, the goal is to turn a prisoner’s dilemma, whereby parties with access to
a commons resource believe they are making a decision that is in their own
“best” interest but that in fact results in a worse outcome for every party
involved, into a Pareto-optimal outcome, whereby it would be impossible for
a party to make himself better off without necessarily making another party
worse off.62  Thus, in the herder’s case, fencing off the pasture and dividing it
60 See Alice Kenny, Ecosystem Services in the New York City Watershed, ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE (Feb. 10, 2006), http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/article.news.php?
component_id=4130&component_version_id=6440&language_id=12 (last visited Feb. 8,
2010); Bradley I. Raffle, Carrots and Sticks: Incentivizing Private Land Conservation,
ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (May 11, 2006), http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/article.
opinion.php?component_id=4349&component_version_id=6266&language_id=12 (last vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
61 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  Scholars have noted this potentiality arising out of Kelo; for
instance, Professors Somin and Adler argue that the Kelo decision “is bad for property owners
and environmental protection alike.” See Ilya Somin & Jonathan Adler, The Green Costs of
Kelo: Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
623, 623–28 (2006)(citations omitted).  John A. Baden, founder and chairman of the Founda-
tion for Research on Economics and the Environment, has made similar arguments. See Ba-
den, supra note 59. R
62 OSTROM, supra note 1, at 5. R
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into private property will theoretically cause each herder to prohibit the flock
from consuming more grass than can sustain the herd and to add no more
sheep than the pasture can sustain.  Yet due to various failures in the market,
such as imperfect information, “free-riders,” transaction costs, collective ac-
tion problems, and other failures to internalize externalities, environmental
destruction remains, even in the presence of our private property rights sys-
tem.63  In an effort to correct these market failures in the United States, gov-
ernment — and especially the federal government — has intervened by
regulating the environment, setting the stage for conflicts between the vari-
ous levels of government as well as between the government and private
property owners.
Though scholarly literature has discussed market failures associated
with private property rights as a solution to the commons,64 scant attention
has been given to the idea that natural capital subject to private property
rights and to markets is itself a commons. When we view resources subject
to private property rights as a commons we can better understand how the
states themselves, as primary regulators of private property and land uses,
become fifty rational herders appropriating natural capital from the land
within their borders (or, stated differently, facilitating appropriation of natu-
ral capital through state land use law that promotes economic development
activities).  As argued in Part IV, below, we can then see that federal regula-
tion of the environment provides a mechanism to “fence” the environment
in order to prevent the destructive effects of states as herders.  The federal
government maintains this authority under the Constitution because of its
commerce power to regulate economic activity each time a developer devel-
ops a parcel of land or an individual extracts and consumes natural resources
subject to interstate markets — these activities having inherent effects on
commerce in the commons of other states.  In short, once we adjust our scale
of analysis to see our private property rights system as entrenching a natural
capital commons, we can gain a clearer picture of what does and what does
not represent constitutionally valid federal regulation of the environment
under the Commerce Clause.
Most commons research focuses on the difficulties in privatizing or
otherwise managing “fugitive resources, such as groundwater, oil, and fish,”
and “almost all [resource economists] share the presumption that the crea-
tion of private property rights to . . . land is an obvious solution to the prob-
lem of degradation.”65  Yet, though privatization of the pastoral commons
might provide adequate protection for the grass as long as it is managed by
the herders and valued primarily as natural capital, what happens when other
parties are introduced who value other resources, such as use of the land to
63 See generally Sinden, supra note 58. R
64 See generally id.; ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON GOOD (2003); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315
(1993).
65 OSTROM, supra note 1, at 60. R
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develop human-made capital?66  For example, assume for a moment that af-
ter division of the property amongst the herders the rational herder is ap-
proached by the rational grocer, who wants to develop a market to sell
various agricultural products for human consumption.  The grocer offers the
herder a nice sum of money for the land — an amount substantial enough
for the herder to rationally retire.  Market demand for grocery products is
high, and in fact the country where the herders and grocers reside, the “Ra-
tional States of America,” has established that one of its primary metrics of
economic growth is “new grocery starts.”  Thus, the higher the number of
new grocery starts, the stronger the economy.  This in turn shapes various
government policies aimed at promoting new grocery starts.  In this way, we
see that incentives are aligned for an increasing number of herders to sell
their pasture lands, and the natural capital contained on those lands, to an
increasing number of grocers.  What becomes of the grass?  Once the gro-
cers obtain a private property interest in the pasture lands it remains exceed-
ingly difficult to exclude their appropriation of depletable natural capital.  In
establishing their places of business the grocers rid the land of the grass,
construct their markets and pave the property to allow parking for custom-
ers.  In other words, the grocers completely replace natural capital with
human-made capital.  Should the national government enact an “Endangered
Grass Act” to protect the resource?  How would the grocers respond to such
legislation?
Of course, this hypothetical is meant as a metaphor for the current state
of affairs in the United States, where rapid development and sprawl threaten
natural capital present on lands owned by rational private property owners
seeking to maximize individual economic return from their property.  New
home starts are a leading indicator of the strength of the economy, as are
various other consumer reports and indices — many of which are explicitly
linked to land development facilitating greater consumptive capacity.67  An
astounding example of our reliance on consumption and development in de-
termining the strength of national economies is evidenced in a recent study
by researchers at Brown University, who have suggested a new means of
determining the growth in gross domestic product (“GDP”) of the develop-
ing and developed world — from outer space.68  These researchers have ac-
tually tracked, via satellite, changes in the intensity of artificial light over a
country at night.  They determined that increases in artificial light parallel
increases in household incomes, thus signaling GDP growth.  In a world
where the clearing of natural capital from more and more land results in the
generation of more and more electricity driven by the consumption of more
and more fossil fuels, which in turn indicates a growing and strong econ-
66 Human-made capital includes “factories, buildings, tools, and other physical artifacts
usually associated with the term ‘capital.’”  Costanza & Daly, supra note 7, at 38. R
67 Ryan Barnes, Investopedia, Economic Indicators: Housing Starts, http://www.investo
pedia.com/university/releases/housingstarts.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
68 Measuring Growth from Outer Space, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 63.
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omy, incentives are aligned to rush toward just the type of tragedy described
by Hardin.  Indeed, experts estimate that increasing populations in the
United States alone will require the development of seventy million more
housing units by 2040, and forty million of those will be built on new resi-
dential lots.69
What of the other resources displaced by this development, consump-
tion, and economic growth?  What of biodiversity, wetlands, forests, and
other resources on the land?  In fact, should we go further back and ask how
Hardin’s rational herder came to have pasturelands in the first place?  Per-
haps a private property rights system was already in place and the rational
herder simply bought the property from a rational forester, who had previ-
ously managed the land for forest products until a shift in the market simul-
taneously caused the forest products industry to move overseas and
agricultural products like grass and sheep to become more valuable.  Thus
the rational herder came to own the property by paying the rational forester a
nice sum — enough for the forester to rationally retire — and then con-
verted the property from forest land to agricultural land with a plentitude of
grass resources.  Though grass resources remained, the trees were gone, and
gone too were the services they provided and other resources present in the
forest.70  Though this example reflects the replacement of one type of natural
capital with another, the diverse uses to which forested natural capital may
be put arguably make it of far more natural resource value than grassland
used almost exclusively for providing sustenance to an agricultural herd
(which actually may be characterized as part natural, part human-made
capital).
In this way, we can see that even though the forester’s trees were fenced
in and privatized, as was the subsequent herder’s pasture, a “tragedy” is
likely to occur at each step in the chain of ownership regarding various im-
portant natural resources — even in the presence of a private property rights
system.  This is due in large part to the aforementioned tension between the
property rights system, state governments, and the federal system of envi-
ronmental regulation seeking to protect against such tragedies.  Though there
is an important role for private property as one solution to the tragedy of the
commons, an overly aggressive private property rights system — i.e., one
that resists almost all forms of environmental regulation — does not posi-
tively address destruction of the commons, but instead facilitates it.71
69 Arthur C. Nelson & Robert E. Lang, The Next 100 Million, PLANNING MAGAZINE, Jan.
2007, at 4.
70 Such ecosystem services include managed forests’ role in watershed protection, flood
control, the safeguarding of habitat, biodiversity, genetic resources, and the preservation of
cultural and recreational values. See Bastiaan Louman et al., Forest Ecosystem Services: A
Cornerstone for Human Well-Being, in ADAPTATION OF FORESTS AND PEOPLE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE — A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 14, 17 (Risto Seppa¨la¨ et al. eds., 2009),
http://www.iufro.org/science/gfep/embargoed-release/download-by-chapter/ (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
71 Rasband et al. describe this problem in terms of a failure of privatization of property to
lead to the most socially beneficial use of land.  They state:
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In today’s contentious world of environmental protection versus private
property rights, this tragedy reflects a modified version of Hardin’s tragedy
of the commons.  Though the “commons” present in our private property
system may not be readily apparent, by simply readjusting the scale at which
one views the system and then applying commons analysis, it becomes more
clear: each individual herder can be replaced by each individual private
landowner who owns a segment of private property, and the pastoral com-
mons can be replaced by the network of individually owned private proper-
ties which constitutes “the environment” (what this Article calls the
“collective privatized environment”72).  When economic development activ-
ities or other markets implicate the appropriation of landed natural capital
present within the collective privatized environment, these resources become
privatized commons resources.  This natural capital meets the definition of a
commons resource because it is: (1) depletable and (2) it is extremely diffi-
cult, in the absence of government intervention, to exclude any one private
property owner from appropriating the natural capital and replacing it with
human-made capital or from appropriating it pursuant to an interstate
market.
Applying commons analysis at this level, we see that it is often in the
best interest of the individual private property owner to maximize the eco-
nomic benefit received from his or her property, which may potentially en-
tail selling 100 acres of pristine forest for retail development.  The negative
cost of losing 100 acres of pristine forest, however, accrues to the entire
collective privatized environment, and necessarily affects surrounding prop-
erty owners.  Thus, the negative cost suffered by the individual property
owner is only a fraction of the total negative environmental cost that accrues
to the collective privatized environment.  Therefore, with benefits far out-
weighing apparent costs, each individual private property owner may act to
maximize the economic benefit provided by converting natural capital to
human-made capital on his or her property.  If enough private property own-
ers act in such a manner, as do the herders in Hardin’s example, then so
much natural capital — i.e., 100-acre plots of forests — may be spent that it
can have a devastating effect on the collective privatized environment.
Ostrom, the preeminent commons scholar of our time, noted this poten-
tial, though even she explicitly distinguished landed resources within her
analysis.  Ostrom noted that:
Perhaps the new owners of the commons wish to use it for mini-golf while the sheep
starve. This may be economically efficient if it accurately reflects the land’s most
valuable use (as measured by willingness to pay).  If the government wishes to en-
sure the important public goals of a secure food supply or supporting family farms,
they will need to step in.  Property rights advocates would approve of this course of
action, so long as the government paid the property holders.
JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POL-
ICY 71 (2d ed. 2009).
72 This phrase is another term of art meant to translate a commons analysis to privatized
resources.
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It is difficult to know exactly what analysts mean when they refer
to the necessity of developing private rights to some [commons]
resources . . . . It is clear that when they refer to land, they mean
to divide the land into separate parcels and assign individual
rights to hold, use, and transfer these parcels as individual owners
desire . . . . In regard to nonstationary resources, [however,] such
as water and fisheries, it is unclear what the establishment of pri-
vate rights means . . . . In regard to a fugitive resource, a diversity
of rights may be established giving individuals rights to use partic-
ular types of equipment, to use the resource system at a particular
time and place, or to withdraw a particular quantity of resource
units (if they can be found). But even when particular rights are
unitized, quantified, and salable, the resource system is still likely
to be owned in common rather than individually.73
Ostrom’s insight regarding nonstationary, fugitive resources is no less rele-
vant to the private property system in land, which she distinguishes.  Ostrom
cites fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation canals,
bridges, parking garages, mainframe computers, streams, lakes, oceans, and
other bodies of water as examples of “resource systems.”  The collective
privatized environment is yet another resource system, comprised of natural
capital subject to private property rights.  Stated differently, the “resource
units” making up the system — defined as “what individuals appropriate or
use from resource systems”74 — are the privatized commons resources on
individual parcels of private property.
The process “of withdrawing resource units from a resource system” is
called “appropriation,” and parties who withdraw resource units are called
“appropriators.”75  Ostrom gives numerous examples of appropriators, such
as herders, fishers, irrigators, commuters, and “anyone else who appropri-
ates resource units from some type of resource system.”76  Within the collec-
tive privatized environment, we can see that developers, for example, are
appropriators in the business of appropriating natural capital, most often re-
placing it with human-made capital.  Given that state governments are re-
sponsible for regulating land uses and development activities, as discussed
73 OSTROM, supra note 1, at 13 (emphasis added).  In discussing the value of leaving some R
resources as commons rather than privatizing them, such as roads and waterways, other schol-
ars have briefly alluded to the relationship between our private property rights system and a
commons.  Carol Rose states:
Indeed a private property regime itself — whether governmental or customary —
may be understood as a managed “commons” — a meta-property held in common
by those who understand and follow its precepts.  In a sense, a movement toward
private property is a movement from a “commons” in a physical resource to a
“commons” in the social structure of individualized resource management.
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 746–47 (1986).
74 OSTROM, supra note 1, at 30. R
75 Id.
76 Id. at 31.
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below, even state governments can be considered appropriators of the collec-
tive privatized environment, allowing — through their bodies of land use
law — appropriation of natural capital for development.  In short, though
private property rights in land are “unitized, quantified, and salable,” as Os-
trom noted regarding other natural resources, the collective privatized envi-
ronment resource system is “owned in common” by the collection of
rational private property owners in a given area.77  Thus a commons exists
within our private property rights system in land ownership, and one rational
private property owner’s actions affect the value and amount of natural capi-
tal available to surrounding private property owners.
Though not referring specifically to privatized natural capital, Ostrom’s
statement that “[s]imply closing the boundaries [of the resource system] is
not enough”78 rings just as true for the landed natural capital in our private
property rights system.  This is because “[i]t is still possible for a limited
number of appropriators to increase the quantity of resource units they har-
vest so that they . . . totally destroy the resource.  Consequently, in addition
to closing the boundaries, some rules limiting appropriation and/or mandat-
ing provision are needed.”79  Modern day developers are appropriating re-
source units of landed natural capital at an alarming rate, which presents a
real danger to the resource system.  An example is the plight of the modern
“rational farmer” in California, and involves the domino effect created by
one farmer selling the family farm to sprawling development interests.  De-
77 See OSTROM, supra note 1, at 13. R
78 Id. at 92.
79 Id. (citation omitted).  Similar to Ostrom’s distinction between land and commons re-
sources, some scholars have suggested that Hardin’s commons analysis applies only to open-
access regimes, which are characterized by an absence of property rights. See, e.g., Sinden,
supra note 58, at 547 (describing Hardin’s tragedy of the commons as better conceptualized as R
“the tragedy of open-access”).  It seems clear, however, that the question is merely one of
scale.  Each rational private property owner acts as a rational herder on the collective priva-
tized environment, and the appropriation of natural capital is open to all other rational private
property owners — so, under that conceptualization, our private property system is “open-
access,” and the collective privatized environment is, to use Ostrom’s phrase, a “common-pool
resource.”  Each rational private property owner acts to achieve the full economic benefit from
the property, such as by creating human-made capital in a market where development is a key
indicator of economic growth.  Each property owner, however, only suffers a fraction of the
cost.  They will not likely suffer the immediate consequences of replacing their privatized
commons resources with development.  Instead, that cost will be felt by future private property
owners only after the collective privatized environment has become irreparably harmed.  This
occurs because of the two defining characteristics of a commons: (1) the use of a depletable
resource is consumptive; and (2) it is difficult to exclude appropriators from accessing the
resource.  Daniels, supra note 37, at 906.  Importantly, Daniels noted that: R
A consumptive use does not necessarily permanently diminish the amount of a com-
mons resource available, but it diminishes opportunities for rival users at least for a
time.  For example, a pedestrian on a sidewalk takes up space on the sidewalk only
while using it; other resources like fisheries are renewable with time; still others like
hard rock minerals are gone once consumed.
Id. Development is a consumptive activity, and through market forces that tie metrics of eco-
nomic growth to development, it is extremely difficult to exclude appropriators from consum-
ing natural capital and from replacing it with human-made capital.
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velopers pay top dollar for such property, which often increases in value as
development approaches farmland.  Eventually, surrounding farmers also
sell out because “selling all or a portion of a farm for development [is] the
only economically sensible option . . . .”80  As a result, “the U.S. is losing
nearly twice as much farmland each year as it did in the early nineties . . .
[and fifty] acres of farmland are converted to development every hour.”81
This basic premise is no less true for important natural resources like forests.
Almost one million acres of forestland were lost to development annually
from 1992 to 1997, a rate of nearly 115 acres per hour.82  An additional
twenty-six million acres of forest could be lost by 2030.83
Eventually, “use of the resource by one [developer] may have adverse
consequences for others,” because when depletable natural capital is availa-
ble to non-excludable developers to appropriate and replace with human-
made capital “individual beneficiaries may not take into account these ad-
verse consequences.  Participants acting independently have incentives to
overuse the resource and thus reduce the total returns.”84  By recognizing
that a private property rights system that takes on the characteristics of a
commons drives this overuse, we undertake an important conceptual shift in
the types of policy solutions proposed and can better understand both the
drivers and constitutional bases for federal environmental regulatory action
under the Commerce Clause.
B. Adjusting the Scale of Analysis is Necessary to
Craft Proper Solutions
As noted above, scholars have highlighted numerous problems associ-
ated with private property rights as a solution to the tragedy of the com-
mons.85  Most of this work, however, has focused on a microeconomics
critique of the failure of our private property rights system to adequately
internalize externalities86 — or, in other words, the failure of most private
property owners to bear the complete costs and benefits associated with their
80 Biodiversity Project, Farmland Loss at a Glance, in GETTING ON MESSAGE: MAKING
THE BIODIVERSITY-SPRAWL CONNECTION, available at http://www.comminit.com/en/node/
265588/306.
81 Id. (also noting that “[b]etween 1982 and 1992, 4.2 million acres of farmland were lost
to development, [m]ore than 56 percent of our food comes from rapidly developing counties
on the edge of urban centers, 32 percent of best quality farmland in highly productive farming
regions of the U.S. has already been irretrievably lost to development,” and that “[c]urrently,
70 percent of prime farmland is threatened by sprawl — 234,500,000 acres nationwide”). See
also Elizabeth Becker, 2 Farm Acres Lost per Minute, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at
A22.
82 Jeffrey Kline, Our National Concern About Forestland Development, TIMBER WEST,
May/June 2005, at 50, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/journals/pnw_2005_kline
003.pdf.
83 Id.
84 Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 54, at 13. R
85 See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 58. R
86 HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 432–39 (3d ed. 1992).
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use of the property.  Take, for example, a farmer seeking to maximize eco-
nomic return from agricultural lands who uses large amounts of inorganic
fertilizer, which is then deposited as run-off into nearby bodies of surface
water.  The ecology of the neighboring water bodies may be greatly altered,
which has a negative effect on all those who rely on the water for consump-
tion, fishing, or similar environmental values.87  Thus, “the commons has
been privatized, but tragedy persists . . . . [F]or an allocation of the com-
mons into private property to effectuate a solution to the tragedy: there must
be no remaining externalities or spillover effects — each private property
owner must bear the full social costs and benefits of her actions.”88
While important, this analysis of internalizing externalities is too nar-
row in focus, conceptually severs the commons from the private property
system, and supposes that the latter has replaced the former.  By focusing on
case-by-case flaws (failure to internalize externalities on certain properties)
in a system (private property rights) that has supposedly replaced the com-
mons, policy-makers and academics propose solutions based upon a particu-
lar — and incomplete — conception of the problem.  This approach takes us
too far along the road to believing we have approached a solution to the
problems presented by the commons, which it views as largely eliminated
but for various remaining externalities yet to be internalized.
Another shortcoming of the narrowly focused “internalization of exter-
nalities” solution is that whether private property owners bear social costs
and benefits is a determination made based on societal norms, which may
indeed value use of a plot of land as a farm over a forest or as a Best Buy
over a farm — resulting in a perceived internalization of all outstanding
externalities.  It is extremely difficult to force internalization of externalities
upon property owners who are merely responding to society’s calculus of
what constitutes a “social cost” or a “social benefit.”  Society values a
strong economy, which is currently tied to new housing starts and other con-
sumption and development indicators.89  As such, society will value the
87 Sinden, supra note 58, at 557. R
88 Id.  Other scholars have noted that taxes and financial payments provide a mechanism
for the government to force internalization of externalities on private property.  Rasband et al.
state, in the context of commons resources, that:
[Taxes] may take the form of an entrance fee to graze on the commons.  One might
levy a tax, perhaps on the number of sheep or time spent grazing.  Such market
instruments are attractive because they lead to self-regulation of use.  If the fees and
taxes are set correctly, this instrument quite literally internalizes externalities and
provides a direct incentive to modify behavior, aligning environmental and eco-
nomic interests.  People will find cheaper ways to conserve those scarce resources
and less of the resource will be used over time.
RASBAND, ET AL., supra note 71, at 73.  As discussed, however, as long as measures of eco- R
nomic growth are tied to consumptive development activities, it is difficult to imagine there
not being some party willing and able to pay the tax, strip the land of valuable natural capital,
and replace it with human-made capital.  The government may refuse to set the tax high
enough because of its focus on increasing economic growth, and society may value that type of
economic growth through its consumptive activities — thus behavior may remain unchanged.
89 See Barnes, supra note 67. R
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transfer of property from the forester to the farmer in a developing society
transitioning to an agricultural economy,90 and from the farmer to the com-
mercial developer in a society transitioning from an agricultural economy to
greater levels of industrialization.91  A commons analysis allows a sharper
focus on the mechanism driving environmental damage to the collective
privatized environment and brings scarcity and rivalry more clearly into the
picture.  This allows for the crafting of more precise policy responses to the
commons problems we can see in our private property rights system.  With-
out such responses, natural capital present in that system, and thus the col-
lective privatized environment, will remain a commons with all the attendant
management complexities.
One of the most important of these complexities, which scholars have
failed to take into account, actually takes the form of one of the most funda-
mental private property rights — the right to alienate property.  Though indi-
vidual private property owners can certainly replace natural capital on their
property with human-made capital or appropriate natural capital pursuant to
an interstate market, a property owner being able to sell land to other devel-
opers effectively removes the “fences” from around the rational private
property owner’s property and makes appropriator excludability even more
difficult.  The right to alienate provides yet another example of how the col-
lective privatized environment operates no differently than a commons gen-
erally.  In fact, we might say that the well-known property concept of the
“rule of capture” applies to private parcels of property, as developers rush to
purchase, develop, and remove valuable natural capital from land as quickly
as possible.  Paraphrasing Ostrom’s analysis regarding a more well-recog-
nized commons resource, groundwater basins, we can see that since the rule
of capture grants developers an exclusive right in the land, what a developer
does not purchase today in a developing area will be purchased by rival
developers tomorrow.  The fear that developers cannot purchase, or capture,
tomorrow what they do not purchase today undermines any countervailing
motive to forego a current purchase for a future purchase.92  Thus we see that
“[t]he two incentives reinforce one another to aggravate the intensity of the
[development] race.  Without a change of institutions, [developers] in such
a situation acting independently will severely overexploit the resource.
Overexploitation can lead to destruction of the resource itself.”93  In short,
90 Conversion of rainforests to agricultural farms in Brazil and Indonesia via the mecha-
nism of slash-and-burn is one example. See Tomich et al., Agricultural Development with
Rainforest Conservation: Methods for Seeking Best Bet Alternatives to Slash-and-Burn, with
Applications to Brazil and Indonesia, 19 AGRIC. ECON. 159 (1998).
91 This valuation is evidenced by the rapid transition from farmland to development in the
United States. See BIODIVERSITY PROJECT, supra note 80. R
92 Ostrom, supra note 1, at 109 (citation omitted). R
93 Id.  Under a traditional analysis of this problem one might argue that if the seller of the
property and the buyer of the property actually had acted upon perfect information, including
the full economic value of the ecosystem, then the market itself would resolve the problem and
the property owner would either keep the property and internalize externalities or only sell the
property to a subsequent owner who would also internalize externalities and thus protect the
collective privatized environment.  Given the practical realities of our market system, how-
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development of resources on private property meets all of the definitions of
commons resources described above.  Developers are appropriators of a re-
source (natural capital on private land) that is depletable, and it is very diffi-
cult — if not impossible in the absence of government intervention — to
exclude developers from appropriating this natural capital.94
Regardless of whether a developer/appropriator of natural capital is a
current owner of the property, or one to whom the property is sold, from the
developer’s perspective replacing natural capital with human-made capital
will internalize all of the costs and benefits to that developer.  As long as
ever, and our measures of economic growth, see Barnes, supra note 67, it is impracticable to R
assume this result and to rely on this explanation to provide an adequate solution, for the
reasons argued in this section.
94 Another complexity arises out of the “full information” externality and its relationship
to the appropriation of privatized commons resources by individuals and developers.  Sinden
has argued that “information problems . . . cause market efficiency to diverge from real social
welfare.  If . . . market participants are ignorant of the valuable services that a given ecosystem
provides, they may make choices in the market that lead to the ecosystem’s degradation and
thereby decrease real welfare.”  Sinden, supra note 58, at 594.  Though full information is R
required to fully internalize externalities, a government regulator seeking to address externali-
ties will rarely, if ever, have full information.  More importantly, individuals who may have
full information about, for example, the valuable services a given ecosystem provides, and
who may be sympathetic to it, will often fail to act upon such information.  In addition, tempo-
ral informational issues make it virtually impossible for individual private property owners to
internalize externalities that will negatively affect only future generations.  In other words,
information problems are compounded by the temporal nature of monetary need and the pros-
pect of economic return.  As described by Ostrom:
Individuals attribute less value to benefits that they expect to receive in the distant
future, and more value to those expected in the immediate future. In other words,
individuals discount future benefits — how severely depends on several factors.
Time horizons are affected by whether or not individuals expect that they or their
children will be present to reap these benefits, as well as by opportunities they may
have for more rapid returns in other settings.
OSTROM, supra note 1, at 34.  Thus it is extremely difficult to determine the costs of appropri- R
ating privatized commons resources over temporal scales, and, as noted, even if full informa-
tion is available, countervailing considerations may cause people to disregard such
information.  Consequently, a property owner who must place an ill spouse in a nursing home
late in life, but who also cares greatly for the environment, may maximize economic return
from their 100 acres of property by selling it to the highest bidder — even if it is sold to a
developer set on completely consuming the resource.  In other words, even though market
failure scholarship bemoans the lack of full information by parties entering into transactions,
other pressing life considerations complicate the ability of individuals to act upon full informa-
tion, even if it is available (which it is often not).
Thus a person may understand and value fully the services and benefits provided by the
ecosystem and may still appropriate the resource due to other considerations. This effect on
the individual with a sick or dying spouse is consistent with Ostrom’s finding that “[d]iscount
rates are affected by the levels of physical and economic security faced by appropriators.” Id.
at 35.  Appropriators who are uncertain of whether they will have enough economic resources
to simply survive will discount future values heavily when compared to increasing the
probability of surviving in the present. Id.  For example, take the family farmer pressured to
sell to developers, discussed above.  If resources can be destroyed by the actions of others
regardless of what the family farmer decides to do (such as other family farmers in the area
selling their land), even farmers sensitive to the need for environmental protection will begin
to heavily discount future benefits from the resource as compared to the economic benefits of
sale in the present. See id.
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economic growth is measured by development and consumption indices and
society desires economic growth, development will continue to occur with
developers bearing the full societal costs and benefits of their development
— a distinct question from whether they will bear the environmental costs
and benefits.
To see this, one needs only to assess how the property right is defined
from the developer’s perspective, or, rather, what property right the devel-
oper deems itself to have.  A developer’s sole purpose is to gain revenue and
profit from its development, and people will likely still buy the homes,
shoes, food, clothing, and electronics made available by development no
matter how much damage is done to the collective privatized environment,
largely because they do not see the damage in the aggregate.  The developer
will gain the full benefit of its activities, and its true cost will be merely
shifted to another harm spread across the populace that is seemingly unre-
lated to the activity at hand.  The true cost is not the same as the societal
cost, since society values development as signaling a strong economy.  In
other words, society values a new housing development or Best Buy for the
services they provide and for what they signify generally about the state of
the economy.  As a result, society engages in consumptive activities that
may not result in apparent environmental harm at the site of the individual
development in question.  When aggregated with the effects of other devel-
opments across the country (the collective privatized environment), how-
ever, environmental harm is indeed occurring on a grand scale.95  The
populace as a whole may eventually suffer from the loss of biodiversity
caused by the destruction of medicine-bearing plants or from the loss of
clean water due to increased impervious parking lot surfaces and nitrogen
run-off.  Even if the populace is aware of these facts it is unlikely to stop
purchasing new homes, food, shoes, clothing, and electronics — nor does
society seem interested in shifting away from the use of these metrics to
signify economic growth and prosperity.  Thus, from the developer’s per-
spective, it will never bear the burden of harm that results from its activity.96
95 Professor Karkkainen has provided a succinct summary of the driver for this behavior in
the context of biodiversity protection:
Despite biodiversity’s global benefits, many biodiversity-rich landowners, communi-
ties, and states will calculate that they will be better off externalizing the costs of
biodiversity by letting local land conversion and development proceed apace, while
leaving the costs of conservation to others.  Indeed, states and communities with the
largest inventories of undisturbed habitat and ecosystems are probably the least in-
clined to protect them for two reasons.  First, from a local perspective, these lands
may appear to be an overabundant resource.  Second, these localities may be reluc-
tant to protect these resources because they would carry a disproportionate share of
the localized costs of conservation if they must forego development on a dispropor-
tionate percentage of their lands.
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 74–75 (1997) (citations
omitted).
96 Furthermore, no amount of information can force the internalization of that externality
because of countervailing information from the current structure of economic markets — so a
greater amount of information about the value of natural capital without an accompanying
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In addition, as discussed in the next section, in many instances state govern-
ments do not appear willing to act upon information that externalities are not
being internalized, as the “race-to-the-bottom” often causes them to vie for
economic benefits by lowering environmental standards related to land use
and consumptive development activities.
Ultimately, the complexities described above — by no means an ex-
haustive list — arise out of the commons nature of natural capital within our
private property rights system, and are not just traditional environmental
microeconomics problems.  As long as private property owners and state
governments remain “rational,” and as long as there is no coordinated gov-
ernment interaction within the collective privatized environment, these
privatized commons resources are in danger of over-consumption with tragic
consequences.
IV. DRIVER FOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION — “RATIONAL
STATE GOVERNMENTS” AS HERDERS ON THE NATIONAL COMMONS
Broadening the scale even further, the rational herder, grocer, farmer,
forester, and private property owner can be replaced by the rational state
government.  Given current indicators of economic growth,97 it is in each
rational state government’s best interest to keep the collective privatized en-
vironment as open as possible to development interests.  This approach re-
sults in individual governments maintaining lax land-use restrictions relative
to rival governments to avoid losing development interests to neighboring
states or local communities.  This oft-discussed98 race-to-the-bottom among
states can stifle innovative land use measures that could assist in preserving
finite natural capital increasingly under growth and population pressures.99
Scholars have provided empirical data supporting the conclusion that the
change in economic structures will therefore fail to facilitate behavioral change. See supra
discussion in note 94. R
97 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. R
98 See Van Loh, supra note 45; Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: R
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 281–82 (1997); Neal D.
Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bot-
tom Thesis, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 174 (2006).
99 One scholar has aptly described the race-to-the-bottom as a form of the tragedy of the
commons, noting:
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community
may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail
substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic development for fear that the
resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to
other areas with lower standards.  If each locality reasons in the same way, all will
adopt lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if there were
some binding mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher stan-
dards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or development.  The costs
and uncertainties of bargaining among many state or local government units render
such a compact improbable.
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regulatory decisions of regional “competitors” negatively impact the strin-
gency of state environmental regulatory standards, as states “attempt to re-
duce the cost of doing business in the state in order to maintain current
industrial production within the state and attract new production.”100
Thus, the race-to-the-bottom constitutes recognition of the states as ra-
tional herders on the pastoral commons that is the collective privatized envi-
ronment, and further demonstrates the commons attributes of natural capital
on private lands.  States compete with each other to maintain lax land use
standards, rendering it exceedingly difficult to exclude developers from ap-
propriating natural capital.  In fact, lax state land use laws actually promote
non-exclusivity, as their goal is to promote the creation of human-made cap-
ital, even if at the expense of depletable natural capital.101  So not only do
commons tragedies exist, but states are also quite purposeful in promoting
tragedies of natural capital commons.
These attributes of the collective privatized environment in turn result
in consumptive development scars, present all across our modern landscape.
Take, for example, the transition from the indoor mall of the 1980s and
1990s to the indoor/outdoor “town center” mall hybrids of the 2000s.102  In-
door malls are often larger than 2 million square feet.103  This is 2 million
square feet of human-made capital, the development of which likely appro-
priated a significant amount of natural capital.  Yet, due to a shift in con-
sumer preferences from indoor malls to big box retailers and the modern
indoor/outdoor mall hybrids, indoor malls are quickly becoming “ghost
towns” or “dead malls.”104  Between 2007 and 2009, four hundred of the
United States’s two thousand largest indoor malls closed.105  The shift from
indoor mall to modern retail centers results in two expansive developed par-
cels of land, one used for its original intended purpose while the other sits
vacant.106  The site of a dead mall “can rapidly turn into a wasteland of
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Imple-
mentation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211–12 (1977) (footnote
omitted).
100 Woods, supra note 98, at 175. R
101 See Stewart, supra note 99, at 1211–12. R
102 See Kris Hudson and Vanessa O’Connell, Recession Turns Malls Into Ghost Towns,
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2009, at A1; Tony Dokoupil, Is the Mall Dead?, NEWSWEEK, November
12, 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2008/11/11/is-the-mall-dead.html.
103 Largest Shopping Malls in the United States, SHOPPING CENTER STUDIES AT EASTERN
CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY, http://nutmeg.easternct.edu/~pocock/MallsLarge.htm (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
104 Hudson & O’Connell, supra note 102, at A1. R
105 The vanishing shopping mall, THE WEEK, March 26, 2009, http://theweek.com/article/
index/94691/The_vanishing_shopping_mall. A website, deadmalls.com, chronicles the life
(and death) stories of hundreds of “dead malls” across the country.  DEADMALLS.COM, http://
deadmalls.com/index.html (last visited March 28, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
106 See Chad Emerson, Mall Farming. . ., LAND USE PROF BLOG: A MEMBER OF THE LAW
PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK (June 15, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/
2010/06/mall-farming.html (last visited March 8, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
30325_hle_35-2 Sheet No. 72 Side B      07/29/2011   14:15:42
30325_hle_35-2 Sheet No. 72 Side B      07/29/2011   14:15:42
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE202.txt unknown Seq: 28 15-JUL-11 15:18
402 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35
overgrown weeds, cracked concrete, and stray animals, with looters picking
sites clean of copper tubing, light fixtures, and anything else that can be sold
for scrap.”107  Not only do these vacant parcels remain unused as a land and
economic resource, but they also remain stripped of the other natural re-
sources that once existed on the property.  States are complicit in allowing
such duplicative and wasteful uses of developed land, encouraging the crea-
tion of new human capital at the expense of natural capital, even though pre-
existing human capital could be used for the same economic purpose.  The
race between states either to encourage new development or to abdicate en-
vironmental or land use controls so as not to stifle development is the proto-
typical example of rational commons reasoning that “[w]hen an individual
user of the commons resource unilaterally decides to cut back in the com-
mons resource, the appropriator is only leaving more for others.  Particularly
in light of how the commons resource allocates benefits and costs, it does
not make sense to cut back unilaterally.”108
The above-described race-to-the-bottom among states largely drives
federal environmental regulation.  Indeed, Commerce Clause jurisprudence
actually addresses this set of commons problems, and in the context of priva-
tized commons resources.  In the related 1981 cases of Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n109 and Hodel v. Indiana,110 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 (“SMCRA”) “on the ground that the absence of federal legislation
would likely lead to ruinous competition among states lowering state envi-
ronmental standards in order to retain or attract business from other
states.”111  The Court held that provisions of SMCRA protecting discon-
nected intrastate farmlands were constitutional under the Commerce Clause
because of the need to “ensure that production of coal for interstate com-
merce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the environment, or public
health and safety, injury to any of which interests would have deleterious
effects on interstate commerce.”112  Perhaps most importantly, the Court
noted that “[t]he prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competition
is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.”113
Thus, states engage in rivalry over businesses appropriating the mineral re-
source — more for one state means less for another and therefore each fails
to appropriately guide responsible extraction and management of the re-
source.  Indeed, each state has an incentive to encourage the greatest amount
of extraction possible from the collective privatized environment, just as
107 The vanishing shopping mall, THE WEEK, March 26, 2009, http://theweek.com/article/
index/94691/The_vanishing_shopping_mall.
108 Daniels, Presidential Nomination, supra note 37, at 910. R
109 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
110 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
111 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 390–91. R
112 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 327–29.
113 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 282.
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Hardin’s herder ruinously extracts as much grass as possible for the benefit
of the herd.
The Hodel cases’ acknowledgment of the race-to-the bottom, ultimately
grounded in commons reasoning, has jurisprudential implications for other
important environmental legislation, such as the ESA.  The case of National
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (“NAHB”) 114 involved a hospital develop-
ment’s “taking” of endangered species habitat.  As a basis for upholding the
ESA, scholars assert, the NAHB court invoked Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining’s finding that Congress has Commerce Clause authority to regulate
wholly intrastate activities in order to prevent destructive interstate competi-
tion.115  Judge Sentelle dissented, stating “[a]lthough [Judge Wald] asserts
‘striking parallels’ between [the Hodel] cases and the present one, I see no
parallel at all.  In [Hodel], Congress regulated arguably intrastate commer-
cial activities, specifically mining and lumber production for interstate com-
merce.”116  What is striking is Sentelle’s failure to see the parallel — under a
commons analysis “intrastate commercial” consumption and appropriation
of minerals and lumber for “interstate commerce” is indistinguishable from
“intrastate commercial” consumption and appropriation of endangered spe-
cies, when the development impacting the endangered species would clearly
be considered part of interstate commerce.  The appropriation of privatized
commons resources inextricably links the appropriator (here a developer)
and the resource being appropriated (the land containing endangered spe-
cies), incorporating each into the act of appropriation as one economic trans-
action.117  Timber companies appropriate temporally finite lumber resources,
mining companies appropriate finite mineral resources, and developers ap-
114 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
115 See Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 441–42.  Mank has argued that R
“[u]nder Hodel’s rationale, one could reasonably justify regulation of purely intrastate endan-
gered species on the ground that states might fail to protect them because of economic compe-
tition.”  Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 51, at 948. R
116 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1066 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
117 Elinor Ostrom has stated that the goal in addressing commons problems and the de-
struction of natural resources is to determine “how best to limit the use of natural resources so
as to ensure their long-term economic viability.” OSTROM, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis ad- R
ded).  She also noted that “[s]tandard analyses in modern resource economics conclude that
where a number of users have access to a common-pool resource, the total of resource units
withdrawn from the resource will be greater than the optimal economic level of withdrawal.”
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).  Though appropriation from every commons may not be character-
ized as economic, this Article argues that appropriation of privatized commons resources from
the collective privatized environment is economic in nature when appropriation occurs due to
economic development of land, or in a way that has aggregated impacts on a national market
for that resource (whether that market is legal or illegal, such as is the case with marijuana
use).  Outside the scope of this Article is whether the “lone hiker” in the woods, as described
in Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Ginsburg, J. concurring),
engages in an economic activity when appropriating an endangered species.  Though it may be
unclear how Rancho Viejo’s lone hiker in the woods is different from Raich’s lone pot-smoker
in the woods, this Article is concerned with resources directly appropriated into interstate
markets or by land development activities.
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propriate landed natural capital, including endangered species, water, for-
ests, and other resources present on the land.
In this way, we again see that natural capital present within the private
property rights system in the United States takes on the characteristics of a
commons, with fifty rational state governments maintaining authority over,
and vying for, resources of interest to the nation as a whole.118  The state
boundaries are presumably the “fences” around each rational state govern-
ment’s “property.”  As discussed above, however, damage still accrues to
the collective privatized environment when each government acts in its own
best economic interest to the detriment of the collective privatized environ-
ment as a whole — such as by maintaining lax land use controls.  Enter the
Commerce Clause.  This is the circumstance under which some scholars ar-
gue the Framers intended the Commerce Clause to apply — when states are
unable to overcome collective action problems to adequately address an eco-
nomic issue of national concern that could have negative interstate conse-
quences without proper state coordination.119
The federal government has made numerous attempts to halt rational
actors’ destruction of the collective privatized environment through passage
of legislation under the Commerce Clause.120  Take, for example, the case of
a rational state that maintains more lax land use standards than a neighboring
state in order to facilitate economic growth, leading to increased eradication
of endangered species, wetland, or air quality resources within that state.
The ESA, Clean Water Act (“CWA”), or Clean Air Act, respectively, enter
to protect the collective privatized environment and the privatized commons
resources present within it.  Yet these acts have been met with varying levels
of resistance.  Congressional authority to regulate clean air, for instance, has
met little resistance, as under Commerce Clause analysis air more clearly
crosses the “fences” of state boundaries and more apparently affects a
neighboring rational state’s economic interests (or, the neighboring state’s
“commerce”).
118 Scholars have noted that states take on the characteristics of rational herders in other
contexts.  For example, Professor Daniels argues that the perpetual moving up of presidential
primary dates by states constitutes a classic tragedy of the commons, resulting in damage to
the electoral system. See generally Daniels, Presidential Nominations, supra note 37. R
119 Professor Mank has asserted that “Congress may enact legislation under the Com-
merce Clause to prevent states from engaging in a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ to attract businesses
because such competition would probably result in inappropriate intrastate environmental stan-
dards.”  Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 391.  Mank, referencing Professor R
Engel, has also suggested that “the framers of the Constitution would have approved of con-
gressional legislation — based on the Commerce Clause — designed to prevent harmful na-
tional competition that states are unable to regulate effectively.” Id. at 441 (referencing Engel,
supra note 98, at 281–82).  Mank also argues that “there is a significant risk that at least some R
states would race to the bottom to exploit timber or develop land and would destroy critical
habitat currently protected by the ESA . . . .” Id. at 443.
120 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671g (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1387 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k
(2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (2006); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
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Though water regulation causes slightly more Commerce Clause con-
troversy, particularly in the land use context,121 water also typically ebbs and
flows in discernable patterns across state boundaries, affecting the economy
on large scales.  In fact, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has explicitly invoked a commons analysis when discussing the race-
to-the-bottom among states in the context of water resources, stating:
[T]he primary purpose of the effluent limitations and guidelines
[of the CWA] was to provide uniformity among the federal and
state jurisdictions enforcing the [National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System] program and prevent the “Tragedy of the
Commons” that might result if jurisdictions can compete for in-
dustry and development by providing more liberal limitations than
their neighboring states.122
In the United States, however, private land use regulation has been a
power traditionally reserved to state governments under the Constitution, to
exercise as a “police power” for protection of the “general welfare.”123  Cer-
tain powers available to the states are not available to the federal govern-
ment under the Constitution — the Tenth Amendment reserves for the states
all powers not delegated, and it may act as a limit on Congress’s regulatory
authority, “particularly in ‘traditional areas of state and local authority,’ such
as land use.”124  Scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of legal and political
opinion holds that this allocation of power in [the United States] leaves the
states in charge of regulating how private land is used,”125 and that “[l]and
use law has always been a creature of state and local law.”126  The landmark
land use regulatory case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty127 has been described as
a “sweeping paean to the supremacy of state regulation over private prop-
erty.”128  Most importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “the
States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”129 and has said that
“regulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”130
121 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. (“SWANCC”) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
122 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (foot-
note omitted).
123 See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
124 James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource Protection, in
THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 (Lawrence J. MacDon-
nell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010).
125 JOHN R. NOLON, PATRICIA E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND COMMU-
NITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (2008).
126 Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Relig-
ious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003).
127 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
128 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE,
AND CONSERVATION 967 (2006).
129 SWACC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001); see also Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (calling land use regulation “a function
traditionally performed by local governments”).
130 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the closer the nexus between federal regulation and private land
use activities, the more resistance to the federal law.  Such is the case with
the ESA, which allows the federal government to prevent private landowners
from undertaking activities on their property that negatively impact endan-
gered species populations.  This restriction may result in Fifth Amendment
regulatory “takings” claims by landowners resisting limits on both the use
of their property and the economic return that may be gained from their
property.131  State governments may also bring Tenth Amendment claims
that the federal government has exceeded its authority under the Constitution
by treading on land use regulatory powers reserved to the states.132  Thus, the
regulation of privatized commons resources in the land use context is subject
to more resistance than the regulation of other resources, like air and water,
that more clearly cross state boundaries.  The ESA is perhaps the most em-
blematic representation of the former.133  Such resistance would also likely
occur if Congress decided in the future to enact “endangered ecosystem”
legislation, as some have suggested,134 or to regulate some other private land
use activity that adversely affects privatized commons resources.
Given these circumstances, it is important to understand how a com-
mons analysis informs our understanding of the complex relationship be-
tween private property owners, state governments, and the federal
government, and how Commerce Clause authority for federal privatized
commons resource regulation is an extension of that relationship.  Ostrom’s
commons analysis provides the necessary tools to describe the commons
nature of the relationship among individuals, state governments, and the fed-
eral government in the context of federal environmental legislation.  Ostrom
131 See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
132 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1919).
133 Yet the ESA itself is a statute intended to prevent the fifty rational states as herders
from destroying the biodiversity resource.  In Gibbs v. Babbitt, the Fourth Circuit asserted that
the uniform standards of the ESA enhance interstate commerce by avoiding conflicting state
standards. Id. at 501–02, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).  States have traditionally failed to
protect endangered or threatened species, and “[t]he failure of states to provide effective pro-
tection for these species and the advantages of uniform national legislation eventually resulted
in Congress’s enactment of the ESA in 1973.” Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, R
at 432–33.  The federal government “needed to provide uniform standards for protecting all
threatened and endangered species to prevent a race to the bottom by states that may be
tempted to lower their standards to promote economic development.” Id. at 439.  Indeed,
“states are motivated to adopt lower standards of endangered species protection in order to
attract development.” Id. at 442 n.332.
134 Noss, et al. have noted that numerous scientists and conservationists have called for
“endangered-ecosystems legislation (Noss and Harris 1986; Hunt 1989; Orians 1993; M.
Liverman, unpublished draft legislation), endangered-habitat act (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1986),
native-ecosystems act (Noss 1991a, 1991c; Noss and Cooperrider 1994), sustainable-ecosys-
tems legislation (Jontz 1993), or other legislation that focuses on ecosystem protection.”  Reed
F. Noss, Edward T. LaRoe III & J. Michael Scott, Endangered Ecosystems of the United
States: A Preliminary Assessment of Loss and Degradation, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Na-
tional Biological Service (1995), available at http://biology.usgs.gov/pubs/ecosys.htm (last
visited July 10, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  Others have actually
called for “a constitutional amendment to directly preserve, protect, and promote the environ-
ment” to avoid these questions altogether. See, e.g., Gildor, supra note 45, at 821. R
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calls those who arrange for the provision of a commons resource “provid-
ers,” and describes anyone who maintains and ensures the long-term viabil-
ity of the resource system as a “producer.”135  In this way, we see that
individuals engaged in cultivating and appropriating resources subject to an
interstate market (such as marijuana or wheat) are providers of a privatized
commons resource, and the federal government is the producer in charge of
ensuring the long-term viability of the resource system that supplies those
markets.  Similarly, in the context of the Commerce Clause, state govern-
ments may be characterized as providers of natural capital on private lands,
as states maintain primary responsibility for regulating land uses related to
development.  The federal government then acts as the producer of the col-
lective privatized environment as it attempts to use federal legislation such
as the ESA to maintain and ensure the long-term viability of natural capital
on lands primarily regulated by the states.136  In addition, we can describe the
relationship between state governments, as the facilitators of land use, and
developers, who engage in land use activities, as one between “coap-
propriators.”137  Coappropriators are “tied together in a lattice of interdepen-
dence” so long as they continue to share the collective privatized
environment.138
Ultimately, states, private individuals, and developers are coap-
propriators of the collective privatized environment and the privatized com-
mons resources present within it.  When coappropriators act in an
uncoordinated manner, as do Hardin’s herders, they have the potential to
destroy the collective privatized environment, as their lack of organization
leads to poor management exacerbated by collective action problems.139
Again, enter the Commerce Clause and federal environmental regulation
passed pursuant to it — these constitute, respectively, an organizing consti-
tutional provision and corresponding federal action meant to adequately
manage the collective privatized environment in the absence of coordinated
state action.  Without such federal authority, states may remain rational
herders appropriating privatized commons resources from the collective
privatized environment with potentially tragic consequences.
135 OSTROM, supra note 1, at 31. R
136 Id.  Ostrom herself uses a relevant example: she describes a national government that
establishes an irrigation system as a “provider” of the resource system.  If we look at state
governments as appropriators of the collective privatized environment — in the sense that
through their land use laws they appropriate land to developers — then we see that “appropria-
tors engage in a considerable amount of trial-and-error learning.  Many actions are selected
without full knowledge of their consequences.” Id. at 34.  This is the very reason for the
passage of statutes like the ESA.  The fifty states are laboratories for law, and some run better
trials and have fewer errors than others — thus the federal government seeks to regulate the
environment in areas in desperate need of coordination in order to rectify individual appropria-
tors’ (i.e., states’) errors in management.
137 Id. at 38.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 39.
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In the seminal Commerce Clause case, Gibbons v. Odgen,140 Daniel
Webster made the argument, which Justice Marshall accepted,141 that the pur-
pose of the Commerce Clause is to protect the country from “the embarrass-
ing and destructive consequences, resulting from the legislation of so many
different States, and to place it under the protection of a uniform law.”142
This argument extends from that presented to the Constitutional Convention
in the Virginia Resolution, which stated that Congress should be able to
legislate “in those [cases] to which the States are separately incompe-
tent.”143  This Resolution ultimately led to the enumerated federal commerce
power and was “accepted without discussion.”144  Scholars have noted that
“Marshall’s decisional words in Gibbons directly connect the concerns of the
Virginia Resolution to the scope of the commerce power, and in so doing
they state a faithful constitutional understanding of both the federal and state
sides of the commerce power.”145  Justice Marshall’s “decisional words” ob-
served that:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that
its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation,
and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally;
but not to those which are completely within a particular State,
which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary
to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general pow-
ers of the government.  The completely internal commerce of a
State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.146
Through the commons-based lens of the collective privatized environ-
ment, it is clear that appropriative consumption of privatized commons re-
sources inherently affects the amount, type, quality, and value of natural
capital in other states.  This consumption affects entire schemes of intrastate
economic regulation, from the various states’ chosen form of land use regu-
lation (or lack thereof), to national markets, such as agricultural or illicit
drug markets.  As such, privatized commons resource appropriation can
never be “completely internal”147 to any one state.  As demonstrated in the
next Part, when viewed through the lens of the commons, both U.S. Su-
preme Court and lower court jurisprudence can be interpreted as incorporat-
ing Justice Marshall’s understanding of the commerce power into decisions
140 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
141 See Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v. Filburn Displaced, 2005 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 71, 96 (2005).
142 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 11 (syllabus).
143 RECORDS OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AS REPORTED BY
JAMES MADISON 389 (Charles C. Tansill ed., Legal Classics Library 1989).
144 Kmiec, supra note 141 (citing Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More R
States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1934) (emphasis omitted).
145 Id. at 97.
146 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
147 Id.
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involving the scope of federal environmental authority, consistently uphold-
ing federal privatized commons resource regulation.
V. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE VIEWED THROUGH THE
LENS OF THE COMMONS
Applying commons analysis to Commerce Clause jurisprudence allows
us to see that federal courts, through validation of federal environmental
statutes under the Commerce Clause, have effectively recognized the com-
mons nature of privatized commons resources.  These courts, through the
mechanism of the substantial effects test, have perhaps unintentionally
turned the theoretical proposition presented in the previous sections into
constitutional jurisprudential precedent.
Part V.A provides a brief background on various shifts in the Supreme
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence over time and on the relevant Com-
merce Clause cases that have both provided justification for and created con-
cerns over federal environmental regulatory authority.  Part V.B discusses
how a commons analysis applied to Commerce Clause jurisprudence helps
answer three important questions that continually arise in Commerce Clause
cases: the “aggregation,” “object of regulation,” and “scope of federal au-
thority” questions.  The first question regards the role of the aggregation
principle and whether it should be applied to non-economic activities, or
only to those classified as “economic.”  The second question concerns the
controversy over what should be the “object of regulation” focused upon in
Commerce Clause cases.  For example, under the ESA, should the object of
regulation be understood as the endangered species at issue (which may have
no recognized economic value in and of itself), or the development im-
pacting the species (which is more clearly linked to interstate commerce)?
Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions are split on this question.  The third
question regards the “comprehensive scheme” analysis of Raich, which
some scholars argue allows Congress to reach intrastate, non-economic ac-
tivity, and whether it provides any meaningful federalism protections as re-
quired by the U.S. Constitution.148  The answers to these questions provide a
meaningful and unified commons-based rationale to apply in future Com-
merce Clause cases, providing a long-absent but much-needed clarifying set
of principles to the confused mass of Commerce Clause precedent in the
area of federal environmental regulation.
Each of the questions addressed in this part are particularly important
because each relates to the problems presented by attempts to make an eco-
148 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 264
(3d ed. 2006) (stating that “a core principle of American constitutional law is that the federal
government has limited powers with most governance left to the states.  The Court’s expansive
approach to the [C]ommerce [C]lause puts virtually nothing beyond the reach of Congress
. . . .”).
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nomic/non-economic distinction in Commerce Clause cases.  This distinc-
tion is useful for Commerce Clause analysis because “when Congress
reaches inside a state to regulate or prohibit wholly intrastate activities be-
cause of their effect on interstate commerce, requiring that these activities be
economic in nature provides some assurance that doing so is a truly neces-
sary means to effectuate the permissible end of regulating interstate com-
merce.”149 Lopez and Morrison made “significant changes to the Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence,” since “both decisions emphasized that
the Commerce Clause primarily concerns economic regulation and sug-
gested that legislation regulating non-economic activities will receive less
deferential review from the Court.”150  Additionally, Morrison “explicitly
limited Congress’s authority to aggregate non-economic, intrastate actions to
demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”151  However:
A fundamental problem with both the Lopez and Morrison deci-
sions is that they failed to provide a workable test for distinguish-
ing between economic and non-economic activities for the purpose
of determining which intrastate activities may be aggregated to
meet the Commerce Clause’s substantial effects test.  The two de-
cisions strongly imply that courts should aggregate only economic
activities . . . .  Yet, the two cases provide no workable standard
for distinguishing between economic and non-economic activities
. . . .152
The economic/non-economic distinction in the “aggregation,” “object
of regulation,” and “scope of federal authority” questions, however, can be
answered with a commons analysis, which provides the “workable stan-
dard” currently absent from Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Since priva-
tized commons resources are here defined to be those resources appropriated
by economic development of land, or otherwise appropriated by individuals
as a component part of a larger interstate market, they will always be eco-
nomic in nature.  In turn, their designation as economic allows aggregation,
permits application of the substantial effects test to the “object of regula-
tion” that is the act of appropriation, and preserves federalism limitations on
the ability of the federal government to regulate non-commons, non-eco-
nomic activity under the Commerce Clause.
A. The Commerce Clause – A Brief Introduction to Relevant Cases
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution contains the Commerce
Clause, which gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among
149 Barnett, supra note 45, at 748. R
150 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 399–400. R
151 Id. at 400.
152 Id. at 400–01 (footnotes omitted).
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the several States.”153  In the area of environmental protection, the com-
merce power is the most important of all of Congress’s powers, as nearly all
federal environmental laws are adopted by Congress under Commerce
Clause authority.154
Judicial interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause has gone
through numerous shifts over the past 200 years.  From the early nineteenth
century until the 1890s, a “nationalist perspective” guided the U.S. Supreme
Court in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.155  The Court defined Commerce
Clause power broadly and rejected the idea that its exercise violated federal-
ism principles.156  From the 1890s until 1937, the Court shifted to a “federal-
ist perspective,”157 narrowly defining the commerce power and accepting the
concept that some statutes violated principles of federalism by intruding on
areas of state governmental authority.158  From 1937 until 1995, the Court
shifted back to a nationalist perspective, again broadly construing the Com-
merce Clause.159  As previously noted, during this period not one federal law
was struck down as exceeding Congress’s commerce authority.160  During
this era, the Court construed the Commerce Clause broadly to include any
intrastate activity that had a substantial relation to interstate commerce when
that activity’s control was essential or appropriate to protect commerce from
burdens or obstructions.161  The Court also construed “among the states” to
mean virtually anything having an aggregate effect on commerce — as long
as Congress reasonably believed the effect existed, then the regulation was
constitutionally valid.162  During this period, the Court had an “expansive,
and indeed almost unlimited, view of the Commerce Clause.”163
Perhaps the most important case from this nationalist period, for the
purpose of commons analysis, is Wickard v. Filburn,164 which the U.S. Su-
preme Court itself has described as “perhaps the most far reaching example
of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.”165 In Wickard, the
Court upheld Congress’s authority under the Agricultural Adjustment Act to
regulate farmers growing wheat for home consumption.166  The Court found
that such consumption competed with wheat sold in interstate commerce,
153 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
154 Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mu-
tation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 755 (2006).
155 Erwin Chemerinsky, Lecture on the Scope of the Commerce Clause at Duke University
School of Law (Feb. 1, 2005).
156 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 10–12 (1824) (syllabus).
157 Chemerinsky, supra note 155. R
158 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. E. C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895).
159 Chemerinsky, supra note 155. R
160 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 148, at 256. R
161 Id. at 257 (discussing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
162 In other words, the Court used a rational basis standard of review for the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 262 (discussing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)).
163 Id. at 243.
164 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
165 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
166 317 U.S. at 127–28.
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and if thousands of farmers were to engage in the same activity, the aggre-
gate impact of such intrastate consumption would have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.167  Thus, the Court introduced what has come to be
known as the “aggregation principle” into Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
recognizing the inherent depletable and non-excludable nature of privatized
commons resources.168  For the next fifty-three years the Court would uphold
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority in every case in which it was
challenged.169
In 1995, and then again in 2000, the Court returned to a federalist per-
spective in the cases of United States v. Lopez170 and United States v. Morri-
son,171 respectively.  At issue in Lopez was a high school student arrested for
carrying a concealed and loaded .38 caliber handgun and was charged with
violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (“Gun-Free Act”).172  Lo-
pez was convicted and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and two years
of supervised release.  Lopez appealed, arguing that the statute was unconsti-
tutional and exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power.173
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court detailed that
the Constitution created a national government of enumerated powers, em-
phasizing that Article I limits Congress’s legislative powers to those that are
express or implied in the Constitution.174  The Court summarized its Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence up to that point by noting that Congress can
regulate three kinds of activities under the Commerce Clause.  First, Con-
gress can regulate the “use of the channels of interstate commerce,” such as
the regulation of hotels and restaurants during the civil rights movement.175
Second, Congress may legislate “to regulate and protect the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce,” such as railroads transporting people and goods
in interstate commerce.176  Lastly, Congress may regulate “those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.”177
167 Id.
168 Id. at 130.  The Court also established the foundation for Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005), discussed below, which was very similar factually and involved the regulation of simi-
lar resources.  Even though the market for marijuana in Raich was an illegal market, the appro-
priation by an individual of that resource, under a commons analysis, would have an impact on
that interstate market.
169 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 148, at 256. R
170 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
171 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
172 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.  The law prohibited the carrying of a gun within a school zone,
defined as “in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial, or private school” or “within a
distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial, or private school.” 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(a)(25)(A)–(B) (2006).
173 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 558 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)).
176 Id. (citing the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); S. R.R. Co. v. United
States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)).
177 Id. at 558–59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1958)) (emphasis added).
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The Court analyzed the case under the third standard, the substantial
effects test,178 to determine if the Gun-Free Act regulated an activity having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.  The government argued that fire-
arms were sold in interstate commerce, and that the carrying of firearms near
schools would result in a significant aggregate effect on the economy and
interstate commerce.179  The Court, however, found that the Gun-Free Act
was unconstitutional because the mere possession of a firearm near a school
zone had no substantial effect on interstate commerce, the activity was pri-
marily non-economic and unsuitable for aggregation,180 and the regulation of
local criminal activities was traditionally a state or local government func-
tion.181  The Court reasoned that upholding such legislation would open the
door to federal regulation of anything that could lead to violent crime, or
other activities traditionally regulated by the states.182  Key to the Court’s
holding was the fact that the activity of carrying a gun near a school zone
was itself “non-economic.”183  The Court noted that Wickard’s aggregation
doctrine only allowed Congress to regulate activities that had a substantial
economic impact on interstate commerce.184
The U.S. Supreme Court continued its narrow application of the Com-
merce Clause in its 2000 Morrison decision.  The Court used reasoning simi-
lar to that in Lopez to determine that the civil damages provision of the
Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) was unconstitutional because the
targeted violence had no substantial effect on interstate commerce.185  Under
the provision, victims of gender-motivated violence could receive a federal
civil damages remedy.186  In passing the Act, Congress found that “violent
crime against women costs this country at least 3 billion . . . dollars a
year”187 — a finding that was part of Congress’s response to the Supreme
Court’s criticism in Lopez that Congress did not base the Gun-Free Act on
sufficient findings of fact.188 Congress bolstered VAWA with a voluminous
record seeking to demonstrate the interstate economic effects of violence
against women.189
The Court again analyzed the case under the substantial effects test.190
Despite Congress’s finding of billions of dollars of losses due to violence
against women, the Court found that the specific, non-economic activity that
178 Id. at 559.
179 Id. at 563.
180 Id. at 561.
181 Id. at 564.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 559–62.
184 Id. at 556.
185 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–15 (2000).
186 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006).
187 S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
188 Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, “Federalism Whether They Want It or Not”:
The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After
United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 949 n.142 (2001).
189 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
190 Id. at 609.
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Congress was attempting to regulate could not be aggregated to find a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.191  The Court noted that “in those
cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based
upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in
question has been some sort of economic endeavor.” 192  The Court then
found that “[i]f accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress to
regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that
crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or con-
sumption.”193  Thus, the Court posited that such an interpretation of the
Commerce Clause would create a slippery slope that would allow Congress
to regulate all violent crimes in the United States, as well as other non-
economic activities that have some aggregated effect on the economy.194
Morrison further clarified the Court’s narrower view of the commerce power
as expressed in Lopez, that “Congress cannot regulate a non-economic activ-
ity by finding that, looked at cumulatively, it has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.”195  As a result, in Morrison the Court converted the
economic activity rationale discussed in Lopez into a clear constitutional re-
quirement.196  The Court in Lopez and Morrison took this approach on the
economic/non-economic distinction “[b]ecause the aggregation of non-eco-
nomic activities could justify federal usurpation of traditional state func-
tions, [and thus] the Court expressed strong reservations about allowing
Congress to aggregate non-economic activities to show a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.”197
In 2005, the Court decided Gonzales v. Raich198 — the first Commerce
Clause case since the revival of “new federalism” in Lopez that dealt with
the constitutionality of federal government regulation of privatized com-
mons resources.199  Describing the potential implications of Raich for the
precedential value of Lopez and Morrison, Professor Claeys posited that in
191 Id. at 617.
192 Id. at 611 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects
of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature . . . .  [T]he existence of congressional
findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation.  As we stated in Lopez, ‘[S]imply because Congress may con-
clude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not nec-
essarily make it so.’
Id. at 613–14.
193 Id. at 615.
194 Id.
195 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 148, at 264. R
196 Claeys, supra note 45, at 802. R
197 Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 51, at 954. R
198 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
199 SWANCC and Rapanos dealt with privatized commons resources, but the Court did not
reach the constitutional issues raised in those cases, deciding the cases on statutory interpreta-
tion grounds. See text accompanying notes 216–28. R
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Raich “the New Federalism passed from youthful exuberance to middle-
aged sobriety.”200  Given the commons nature of the regulated natural capi-
tal, however, it is not clear that the new federalism is yet in the midst of a
mid-life crisis, as Raich is only a natural extension of the Court’s longstand-
ing treatment of privatized commons resources under the Commerce Clause.
In Raich, the Court considered the validity of the Controlled Substances
Act (“CSA”), which made illegal the possession, distribution, or manufac-
turing of marijuana.201  The CSA conflicted with California’s Compassionate
Use Act, which allowed limited medical use of marijuana.202  The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit construed Lopez and Morrison as dispositive
in its finding that intrastate, personal medical use of homegrown marijuana
was beyond the reach of the federal government, and thus application of the
CSA to the plaintiffs was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Com-
merce Clause power.203
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded to the
Ninth Circuit, finding that the CSA was within Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause.204  Importantly, the Court noted that the case was both
analogous to Wickard205 and consistent with the “new federalism” cases be-
cause “[u]nlike [the statutes] at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities
regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic.” 206  According to some
scholars, the Court also established an alternative holding, that Congress has
“broad discretion to regulate non-economic, intrastate activities as long as it
does so in a comprehensive statute.”207  It is not clear, however, that the
majority opinion established this test.  Though Justice Scalia’s concurrence
did state that “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if
that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate
commerce,”208 the majority never conceded this point, only stating that Con-
gress had the “power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.”209  Thus the majority focused on the “local” nature of the activity
and the “economic” nature of the class, of which the homegrown marijuana
at issue in Raich was a part.210
200 Claeys, supra note 45, at 792 (stating also that “[w]hile the New Federalism has not R
been repudiated, in the future its growth is certain to be far slower and more erratic”).
201 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).
202 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2011).
203 See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
204 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 9.
205 Id. at 18.
206 Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
207 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 410 (emphasis added) (citing Adler, R
supra note 16, at 764–65; Kmiec, supra note 141, at 98). R
208 Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
209 Id. at 17 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  As noted in Justice Thomas’s dissent,
the Supreme Court “has never held that Congress can regulate noneconomic activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.” Id. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 17 (majority opinion).
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Similarly, the Raich majority asserted that “Wickard thus establishes
that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘com-
mercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to
regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate
market in that commodity.”211  The activity in Wickard was still “eco-
nomic,”212 even though not “commercial” in the sense that it would be en-
tering, via sale, an official commercial market.213  The Raich majority’s
recognition that the wheat production in Wickard was not commercial, while
leaving undisturbed the Lopez Court’s previous recognition of the production
and consumption as “economic,” seems to have been overlooked by schol-
ars.214  In fact, the Court suggested the activity was economic for the very
reason that it was not entering the commercial market — being a depletable
resource, the appropriative consumption of the resource by non-excludable
actors would substantially affect the commercial market when aggregated.215
To this point we can see that in the major Commerce Clause cases since
Wickard the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld federal regulatory authority
over natural resources that can be characterized as privatized commons re-
sources.  The two cases, however, that have perhaps caused the most con-
cern over the scope of environmental Commerce Clause authority are Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers (“SWANCC”) 216 and Rapanos v. United States.217  In SWANCC, a
group sought to purchase an abandoned gravel pit to dispose of nonhazard-
ous wastes.218  Water within the pit, however, maintained habitat for endan-
211 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
212 Justice Rehnquist stated in Lopez that “Wickard . . . involved economic activity in a
way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 560 (1995) (emphasis added).
213 The Wickard Court stated that the Agricultural Adjustment Act “extend[ed] federal
regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on
the farm.”  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942).  Scholars seem to interpret this
statement as evidence that the Raich Court relied on Wickard to prove that intrastate, non-
economic activities that are part of a broader comprehensive scheme can be reached by federal
regulation. See Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13.  As noted, however, Justice
Rehnquist stated in Lopez that Wickard involved economic activity. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.  It
is completely consistent to say that use of a resource that will not be entering an official
commercial market is an economic activity, as is the appropriation, this Article argues, of any
privatized commons resources.
214 See, e.g., Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 456 (arguing that the Raich R
majority and Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence “explain . . . that Congress may regulate non-
economic, purely intrastate activities as long as they are an appropriate part of a valid compre-
hensive scheme”).
215 Nonetheless, even if the claim that non-economic activity may be reached under the
“comprehensive scheme” analysis has merit, this Article argues that Raich did involve an
economic activity under a commons analysis, and thus the Supreme Court has yet to declare
that non-economic intrastate activities can be reached under a comprehensive scheme analysis.
This Article further argues that failure to recognize the economic/non-economic distinction
under the comprehensive scheme analysis would leave little to no judicial federalism protec-
tion in place.
216 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
217 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
218 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163.
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gered migratory birds.219  In denying the group’s proposed use, the Army
Corps of Engineers (“Corps”), pursuant to its authority under Section 404(a)
of the Clean Water Act,220 applied the Migratory Bird Rule, which asserted
that the Corps’ jurisdiction extended to intrastate waters “[w]hich are or
would be used as habitat by . . . migratory birds which cross state lines.”221
The government argued that the rule was appropriate because “protec-
tion of migratory birds is a ‘national interest of very nearly the first magni-
tude,’ . . . [and], as the Court of Appeals found, millions of people spend
over a billion dollars annually on recreational pursuits relating to migratory
birds.”222  The Court proceeded, however, to decide the case upon statutory
interpretation grounds in order to avoid constitutional questions about the
scope of the Commerce Clause.223  Rather, the Court narrowly construed the
CWA as not granting the Corps this authority and held that the Act did not
apply to intrastate land merely because of the presence of migratory birds.224
Even though constitutional and federalism questions were raised, however,
some have asserted that “SWANCC is . . . noteworthy for its explicit valida-
tion of federal regulation of activities that ‘substantially affect’ interstate
commerce and for its continued approval of the ‘aggregation doctrine’” —
an important fact given the context of federal environmental regulation.225
The Court again addressed federal authority to regulate the environment
under the CWA in the case of Rapanos v. United States.226  Property owners
challenged the Corps’ authority to regulate portions of property connected to
wetlands by man-made drains.  The Court rejected the government’s claim
that the CWA gave the Corps the power to regulate wetlands regardless of
the connection to “navigable waters.”227  The Court, however, as in
SWANCC, did so based solely upon statutory interpretation grounds, constru-
ing the CWA narrowly and refusing to address the constitutional issues
raised by the property owners.228
219 Id. at 164.
220 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2006).
221 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
222 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
223 Id. at 174.  In so finding, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
These are significant constitutional questions raised by respondents’ application of
their regulations, and yet we find nothing approaching a clear statement from Con-
gress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit such as we
have here.  Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mud-
flats falling within the “Migratory Bird Rule” would result in a significant impinge-
ment of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use . . . We
thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism
questions raised by respondents’ interpretation . . . .
Id.
224 Id.
225 Klein, supra note 45, at 37. R
226 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
227 Id. at 730–32.
228 See Somin, supra note 16, at 127.  Somin argues that “Rapanos probably does not R
impose significant limits on the scope of federal authority under the CWA.” Id. at 130.
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Ultimately, the SWANCC and Rapanos Courts’ Commerce Clause dis-
cussions express “similar federalism concerns as those expressed in Lopez
and Morrison.” 229  Though the types of concerns raised in SWANCC and
Rapanos have caused disquiet among scholars about the future of federal
environmental regulation,230 a commons analysis, as applied to SWANCC in
Part V.B.2, below, demonstrates that the resources at issue in those cases
may be considered privatized commons resources when appropriated by de-
velopment (as is often the case with wetlands and endangered species) or by
individuals as part of a larger, intrastate economic market (as with wheat and
marijuana).  Thus, the appropriation of these resources is in fact intrastate
economic activity that may be constitutionally regulated under the substan-
tial effects test of the Commerce Clause.231  Such was the case with the
wheat in Wickard and the marijuana in Raich, and it was decidedly not the
case with the public goods at issue in Lopez and Morrison — laying the
foundation for Commerce Clause jurisprudence that is actually more consis-
tent than has long been perceived, at least in the area of federal environmen-
tal regulation.  This review of cases sets the necessary background and
context for how a commons analysis answers important, recurring questions
arising in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
B. The Economic/Non-economic Controversy: The Commons Addresses
Difficult Questions Arising Under the Commerce Clause
1. The Aggregation Principle? The Commons Is an Inherently
Aggregated Economic System
As noted, the Court in Wickard introduced the aggregation principle to
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, establishing that intrastate consumption of
privatized commons resources — even if not directly entering an established
commercial market — is economic activity that can be aggregated for the
purpose of finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce.232 Scholars
have argued that the Wickard Court’s formulation of the aggregation doctrine
is problematic because it does not clearly establish which intrastate activities
are appropriate to aggregate in order to determine the validity of legislation
under the Commerce Clause.233  By using the lens of the commons, however,
229 Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 51, at 959. R
230 See supra note 45 for a list of examples. R
231 This Article is not addressing the issue of whether commons analysis necessarily al-
lows regulation of isolated wetlands under the Clean Water Act, since that Act also has an
internal limitation restricting its application to “navigable waters.”  Thus the statute may be
construed as not granting the EPA the authority to regulate isolated wetlands, resulting in an
administrative law limitation as in SWANCC and Rapanos.  Congressional authority to regulate
isolated wetlands as a general matter under the Commerce Clause, however, would be vali-
dated under a commons analysis if the wetland were being appropriated by economic
development.
232 See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. R
233 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 387; Nagle, supra note 45, at 179–80. R
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we can see that the Court’s very establishment of an aggregation principle
incorporates a commons analysis within Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Though the question might be different regarding regulation of social
constructs, like health care and guns near schools,234 the aggregation doctrine
in the context of privatized commons resources like the wheat in Wickard is
no more than recognition of the commons nature of the regulated resource.
A commons is itself a principle of aggregation, because the resources present
in the commons are naturally aggregated.  The aggregate effects of each
herder maximizing economic return and appropriating as much grass as pos-
sible from the pasture results in a reduction of resources all across the com-
mons — leading to its potential destruction.  The same is true for the rational
farmer, forester, developer, or pot-smoker.  Thus the appropriation of priva-
tized commons resources by one party, regardless of the nature of the use
(e.g., commercial versus home consumption of wheat or marijuana) or the
geopolitical or private property boundaries separating appropriators, sub-
stantially affects the economic transactions of other appropriators, i.e.,
“commerce.”
An analysis of the rationales presented in Wickard and Raich supports
these assertions.  In Raich, the majority noted that “[i]n Wickard, we had no
difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that
when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat outside the
regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on price and market
conditions.”235  The Raich majority also noted that in both Wickard and
Raich “the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power because
production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or
marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national
market for that commodity.”236  The substantial influence on price and mar-
ket conditions demonstrates that the “local” activities in Wickard and Raich
were economic, and also that they took on the characteristics of commons
resources because their depletability affects the use, consumption, availabil-
ity (to rival, non-excludable appropriators), and economic value of resources
elsewhere.
In Raich, Justice Stevens distinguished Lopez and Morrison by finding
that neither dealt with regulation of activities that were “quintessentially ec-
onomic.”237 At least one critic has argued that “it is hard to take that argu-
234 It should be noted that regulation of some social constructs, like labor, may be charac-
terized as constituting a commons that may substantially affect interstate commerce — as they
are arguably exclusive and subject to rivalry.  See the important Commerce Clause cases of
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).  Thus, commons analysis may be simi-
larly useful to assess those regulations under the Commerce Clause. Such analysis is, however,
beyond the scope of this Article.
235 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
236 Id.  Justice Stevens also stated that “[o]ne need not have a degree in economics to
understand why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana . . . locally culti-
vated for personal use . . . may have a substantial impact on the interstate market . . . .” Id. at
28.
237 Id. at 25.
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ment seriously on a record that establishes only medicinal use, coupled with
a total absence of buying, selling, or bartering.”238  But a commons analysis
demands serious consideration, as appropriation of these privatized com-
mons resources is by default an economic transaction in a zero-sum world
— whether it be characterized in microeconomic parlance as an internaliza-
tion of externalities or merely as representing the depletion of another rival’s
consumptive use or preservation elsewhere.  In upholding the CSA in Raich,
the majority noted:
Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home
consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an estab-
lished, albeit illegal, interstate market.  Just as the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act was designed “to control the volume [of wheat]
moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid sur-
pluses . . .” and consequently control the market price . . . a pri-
mary purpose of the [Substances Act] is to control the supply and
demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug
markets.239
In other words, the Court equated the “rational farmer” from Wickard with
the “rational pot-smoker” in Raich.  Market price is determined based upon
both rivalry over the resource and supply and demand — as parties seek
access to a resource in a rivalrous fashion, one party appropriates the re-
source, which in the aggregate results in less of that resource for other par-
ties.  What the Court is describing in Raich and Wickard as economic
activity suitable for aggregation is a commons.
Scholars have argued that Wickard and Raich were decided incorrectly,
since the Commerce Clause does not reach intrastate, noncommercial trans-
actions.240  The commons analysis demonstrates, however, that the activities
involved in the cases at issue remain economic in nature, as is the appropria-
tion of any depletable, non-excludable privatized commons resource.  The
“trade” or “exchange”241 of such resources, whereby one person’s appropri-
ation of the resource reduces its availability to others, may not be explicit, as
they may not appropriate the resource directly into an official commercial
market.242  Given the aggregated value of natural capital across the United
238 Kmiec, supra note 141, at 88–89. R
239 Raich, 545 U.S. at 18–19.
240 See, e.g., Steven K. Balman, Constitutional Irony: Gonzales v. Raich, Federalism and
Congressional Regulation of Intrastate Activities Under the Commerce Clause, 41 TULSA L.
REV. 125, 150 (2005).
241 Id. at 151–59 (noting various sources that describe “commerce” as “trade or
exchange”).
242 Such is the case with biodiversity, the loss of which in the aggregate, and when appro-
priated by private parties, would have dramatic effects on the nation’s economy.  Describing
the magnitude of economic impact continued consumptive growth might have on our genetic
heritage, the 1973 House Committee Report on the ESA stated that species loss put our genetic
heritage at risk and “the value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable.”  H.R.
Rep. No. 93-412, at 4 (1973).
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States, however, an economic effect approximating trade or exchange occurs
nonetheless.
A telling illustration of how courts have come to treat regulation of
privatized commons resources as meeting the substantial effects test via the
aggregation principle is the different outcomes delivered by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs v. Babbitt243 and Brzonkala v. Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Institute,244 the precursor to Morrison.  Gibbs was decided
by the Fourth Circuit a little more than a year after it decided Brzonkala, and
less than a month after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Morrison. Gibbs
has been described as a “doctrinal double-standard” when compared to
Morrison.245 Gibbs upheld the ESA’s prohibition on the taking of endan-
gered red wolves from private property, even though the prohibition con-
flicted with a North Carolina statute.246  The Court relied on the Wickard
aggregation principle in holding that the taking of red wolves would substan-
tially affect interstate commerce,247 even though the very same court had
rejected the Wickard aggregation doctrine in Brzonkala.248  The court justi-
fied its distinction by finding that, unlike the legislation in Lopez and Morri-
son, which was aimed at non-economic activity, the legislation in Gibbs was
aimed at “what is in a meaningful sense economic activity.”249  The court
found that:
243 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
244 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
245 Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 188, at 968. R
246 See 214 F.3d at 506; see also 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.84(c)(4)(i)–(iv) (2010). The federal
regulation promulgated pursuant to the ESA that guides the protection of red wolves allows a
person to take red wolves on private land “[p]rovided that such taking is not intentional or
willful, or is in defense of that person’s own life or the lives of others.”  50 C.F.R.
§ 17.84(c)(4)(i) (2010).  Private landowners may also take red wolves on their property “when
the wolves are in the act of killing livestock or pets, [p]rovided that freshly wounded or killed
livestock or pets are evident . . . .”  50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c)(4)(iii) (2010).  A landowner may also
“harass red wolves found on his or her property . . . [p]rovided that all such harassment is by
methods that are not lethal or physically injurious to the red wolf . . . .”  50 C.F.R.
§ 17.84(c)(4)(iv) (2010).
247 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493.
248 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 836 (noting that the statute “cannot be sustained on the author-
ity of cases such as Wickard, which have upheld ‘regulations of activities that arise out of or
are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce’”).  The court also stated that:
To extend such reasoning beyond the context of statutes regulating economic activi-
ties and uphold a statute regulating noneconomic activity merely because that activ-
ity, in the aggregate, has an attenuated, though real, effect on the economy, and
therefore presumably on interstate commerce, would be effectively to remove all
limits on federal authority, and to render unto Congress a police power impermissi-
ble under our Constitution.
Id. at 840.
249 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.  The Court also distinguished the statutes in Lopez and Morri-
son because they dealt with traditionally state-regulated activities, arguing that conservation of
natural resources, unlike regulation of gun possession and domestic violence, was “an appro-
priate and well-recognized area of federal regulation.” Id. at 500.  A discussion of traditional
state versus federal regulatory functions, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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[T]he taking of a red wolf on private land is unlike gender-moti-
vated violence or guns near schools.  The protection of commer-
cial and economic assets is a primary reason for taking the wolves.
Farmers and ranchers take wolves mainly because they are con-
cerned that the animals pose a risk to commercially valuable live-
stock and crops.  Indeed, appellants’ arguments focus quite
explicitly on these economic concerns — they want freer rein to
protect their property and investments in the land.  The relation-
ship between red wolf takings and interstate commerce is quite
direct — with no red wolves, there will be no red wolf related
tourism, no scientific research, and no commercial trade in pelts.250
Some scholars have criticized this distinction as inconsistent,251 but a com-
mons analysis provides a much more meaningful, consistent distinction.
Red wolves are a privatized commons resource being extracted from the
collective privatized environment in the name of economic development.  As
the court itself describes, without explicitly recognizing it, the appropriation
of a privatized commons resource, involving both an appropriator (the farm-
ers and ranchers) and the resource being appropriated (the wolves), is the act
the federal government is regulating, and the act which in the aggregate
substantially affects interstate commerce.  In other words, because regulation
of privatized commons resources seeks to achieve efficient management of
natural capital — allowing depletable consumption of resources while pre-
serving to the extent possible252 their continued availability253 — such regu-
lation can be characterized as an inherently aggregated economic system
with substantial effects on interstate commerce.
In summary, “a principle of aggregation was built into the ‘substantial
economic effects’ test.”254  Since the commons is an inherently aggregated
system, we see therefore that a commons analysis is also built into the test.
With the Court in Raich “reaffirm[ing] that Wickard v. Filburn remains the
dominant Commerce Clause case of the last century,”255 we have perhaps the
most important case in Commerce Clause jurisprudence incorporating a
commons aggregation principle to find that appropriation of privatized com-
mons resources substantially affects interstate commerce.  Thus, the Court
has effectively incorporated a commons analysis into its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, at least in the area of natural capital regulation.  Viewing the
Court’s past Commerce Clause jurisprudence through this lens and adopting
a commons analysis for future cases provides a unified and simplified ratio-
250 Id. at 492.
251 See, e.g., Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 188, at 969–70. R
252 I say “to the extent possible” because certain finite resources, such as minerals, will
not be available in perpetuity.
253 Such is the case with endangered species, whereby the government has made a deter-
mination that the only means of preserving availability of the resource is to temporarily halt
consumptive activity entirely.
254 Kmiec, supra note 141, at 85. R
255 Claeys, supra note 45, at 812. R
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nale for demonstrating an aggregated, “substantial effect on interstate com-
merce” in the area of privatized commons resources.
2. The “Object” of Regulation? The Entire Act of “Appropriation”
A related question has arisen in recent Commerce Clause cases at both
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals levels: what is the “object of
regulation” that federal statutes passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause
seek to address and that in the aggregate must “substantially affect” inter-
state commerce?  As discussed below, courts have indicated that this ques-
tion is important because it informs whether the intrastate activity can
appropriately be considered “economic” so as to allow aggregation under
the substantial effects test.
In Commerce Clause cases, “a court must determine the central or ‘pre-
cise’ ‘object’ of a regulatory statute,” and “how close the nexus must be
between the object and the commercial purposes of the Commerce
Clause.”256 Lopez and Morrison “failed to provide a framework for courts
to use in deciding: (1) which, of possibly several subjects regulated by a
statute, is the central or precise ‘object’ for determining whether the statute
regulates economic or non-economic activities and (2) whether those activi-
ties have substantial impacts on interstate commerce.”257 This is a crucial
oversight, as “a court cannot resolve whether an object or activity is ‘eco-
nomic’ or ‘non-economic’ without identifying what that object or activity
is.”258  Take an example from Supreme Court jurisprudence: in avoiding the
constitutional question in SWANCC, the Court stated that to answer the ques-
tion would require an evaluation of “the precise object or activity that, in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.”259  The Court was im-
plying that if the “object” that must substantially affect interstate commerce
was the simple filling of an isolated gravel pit home to migratory birds,
severed from any broader economic activity related to interstate commerce,
then the application of the Commerce Clause might be in doubt.260
Indeed, the “object of regulation” question has resulted in disagree-
ment regarding whether, under the CWA, wetlands themselves or rather
commercial activities impacting those wetlands should be considered the fo-
cus of the statute.261  The divide is perhaps best evidenced, however, by the
256 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 403. R
257 Id.
258 Id. (quoting David W. Scopp, Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Spe-
cies Act: The Rehnquist Court’s Web of Confusion Traps More Than the Fly, 39 U.S.F. L. REV.
789, 801 (2005)).
259 SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2000).
260 The Court stated that the “object” of regulation was “not clear, for although the Corps
has claimed jurisdiction over petitioner’s land because it contains water areas used as habitat
by migratory birds, respondents now, post litem motam, focus upon the fact that the regulated
activity is petitioner’s municipal landfill, which is plainly of a commercial nature.” Id.
261 See Klein, supra note 45, at 38; Michael J. Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland Regu- R
lations, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2163 (2002).
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debate among the courts of appeals regarding the appropriate mechanism for
applying the ESA.  All courts of appeals to consider Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to the ESA have upheld the statute,262 but as scholars have noted, the
courts have not been able to formulate consistent legal reasoning for doing
so.263  Even so, courts seem determined to uphold the ESA under some ratio-
nale, even if they cannot agree on the mechanism of analysis.  A commons
analysis provides a means by which the varied past rationales of the circuit
courts can be reconciled and can be applied in a clearer fashion in the future.
The “object of regulation” question in the context of the ESA takes the
form of a split among the courts of appeals over whether the ESA regulates
the actual taking of protected species or the commercial activities that result
in the taking of species.264  For example, in Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, the
court held that then-Judge Roberts’s “hapless toad”265 was not the object of
ESA regulation.266  Rather, the court found that the “regulated activity is
Rancho Viejo’s planned commercial development, not the arroyo toad that it
threatens.”267  By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in GDF
Realty Investments v. Norton268 (“GDF”) rejected the argument that the eco-
nomic impact of the development is the appropriate focus of ESA regulation,
instead finding that endangered species in and of themselves have substan-
tial effects on interstate commerce when they are aggregated because of their
“interdependence.”269  This jurisdictional split is troublesome, because
“[t]he [Supreme] Court’s failure to define what objects or activities are
most important in analyzing whether a statutory scheme may regulate an
activity under the Commerce Clause has caused especially difficult problems
for courts deciding whether the ESA is constitutional under the [Commerce]
Clause.”270  Correlatively, the distinction between the approaches of the
Fifth and D.C. Circuits is important because, as noted by Professor Mank:
If a court focuses on the ESA’s means in regulating the economic
impact of the activities that harm endangered species, then the
government likely can regulate large scale construction projects,
but not a lone hiker walking through a forest or perhaps even indi-
vidual homeowners, although in the aggregate both types of activi-
ties could cause significant harm to these species . . . .  By
262 Indeed, federal courts in general have been reluctant to rely on Lopez and Morrison to
strike down environmental regulations. See  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 148, at 273.  For a more R
recent update on Courts of Appeals treatment of the ESA specifically, see Robert Thornton,
9th Circuit Rejects Commerce Clause Challenge to Delta Smelt Biological Opinion, ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES LAW & POLICY (March 25, 2011), http://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.
com.
263 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 428; Lee, supra note 20, at 471–75. R
264 See generally Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 51. R
265 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rehearing denied
(Roberts, J. dissenting).
266 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
267 Id.
268 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
269 Id. at 640.
270 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 405. R
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contrast, under the rationale of GDF, the government could regu-
late a lone hiker or landscaping homeowner who harms any endan-
gered species, no matter how insignificant, because the loss of any
endangered species threatens the delicate balance of ecosystems,
and harm to ecosystems would cause substantial harms to inter-
state commerce.271
The Fifth Circuit based its decision in part upon dicta from the U.S.
Supreme Court in SWANCC, suggesting that the commercial activities at is-
sue in SWANCC were “too far removed from the CWA’s ‘object’ of regulat-
ing ‘navigable waters.’” 272  Professor Mank argues, however, that
“SWANCC itself failed to provide a clear answer about how lower courts
should decide what is the central ‘object’ of a statute — either the statute’s
regulatory ‘targets’ or its beneficiaries — and how close the relationship
must be between the object of the statute and the commercial purposes of the
Commerce Clause.”273  Mank argues that the SWANCC decision in fact sug-
gested that:
[N]either the value of the migratory birds nor the commercial ac-
tivities that motivated the filling in of the wetlands could justify
congressional regulation because they were not the precise object
of the statute.  Instead, the Court implied that the wetlands them-
selves are the “object” that must substantially affect interstate
commerce.274
Other scholars have argued that “intrastate water” was the object regulated
in SWANCC,275 while yet others have stated that the CWA “is not regulating
wetlands use; it is regulating the economic, and often commercial, activity of
land use and development.”276
Commons analysis helps make sense out of this chaos, providing a
clear framework within which to analyze the “object” of natural capital reg-
ulation.  The “interdependence” of species recognized by the Fifth Circuit,
and the recognition by the D.C. Circuit that the actor impacting the resource
is necessarily tied to the resource itself, are each — though previously con-
sidered independent jurisprudential rationales — nothing more than recogni-
tion by the appellate courts of the commons nature of the regulated activity,
or “object,” under the ESA.  In fact, scholars have asserted that the ESA
provides support for the approach of either the Fifth Circuit or the D.C.
Circuit, because “the statute suggests that both commercial activities that
271 Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 51, at 926–27. R
272 Id. at 929.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 960–61 (citations omitted).
275 Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s
Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 890 (2002).
276 Marianne Moody Jennings & Nim Razook, United States v. Morrison: Where the Com-
merce Clause Meets Civil Rights and Reasonable Minds Part Ways: A Point and Counterpoint
from a Constitutional and Social Perspective, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 23, 54 (2000).
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harm species and the species themselves affect interstate commerce.”277
Though these scholars argue that one approach may be more appropriate
than the other,278 this Article argues that not only is it unnecessary to pick
one or the other, but to do so is jurisprudentially incorrect.  The two ap-
proaches cannot be logically separated under the commons appropriation
analysis.
Regulation of commons resources cannot be separated into regulation
of either the appropriator or the resource being appropriated.  One need only
look at the structure of the statutes to determine that wetlands, endangered
species, uncontaminated land, air, and other resources are inseparable from
the activities impacting them — without this interaction there would be no
regulation in the first instance.  A developer, for example, is an appropriator
of the wetlands resource, or of endangered species habitat, and the substan-
tial effects on interstate commerce arise out of the act of appropriation.
Completing the circle, the appropriation substantially affecting interstate
commerce is impossible without the constituent sub-elements of an appropri-
ator (the developer) as well as that being appropriated (the wetlands or en-
dangered species).  In other words, the “object or activity” of regulations
like the ESA and CWA is the entire act of appropriation of privatized com-
mons resources, which combines the appropriator (the herder) with the re-
source being appropriated (the pastoral commons).  It is this act of
appropriation that in the aggregate substantially affects interstate com-
merce.279  Regulating appropriation of privatized commons resources is the
277 Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 51, at 931. See also Michael C. Blumm & R
George Kimbrell, Flies, Spiders, Toads, Wolves, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered
Species Act’s Take Provision, 34 ENVTL. L. 309, 327 (2004) [hereinafter Blumm & Kimbrell,
Take Provision]; Nagle, supra note 45, at 210 (stating “either the means or the ends should be R
able to provide the requisite connection to interstate commerce”) (emphasis omitted); Robert
A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in
Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1245–47 (2003) (arguing the ESA
may apply to both targets of regulation and beneficiaries).  The ESA states that “various spe-
cies of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a conse-
quence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation . . . .”  16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2006).
278 See generally, Mank, Split in the Circuits, supra note 51. R
279 Lee has made a similar argument within the general market failure context:
A developer whose activity eliminates a particular species receives all of the profit
of the development but bears only a fraction of the social cost of eliminating the
species.  The remaining cost is an externality that is imposed on society at large.  The
ESA internalizes this externality by mandating that commercial actors increase the
value that they place on listed species.  Thus, the precise economic activity regulated
by the ESA is the cost-benefit analysis in which developers assign to species loss a
lower value than that assigned to it by society at large.
Lee, supra note 20, at 490.  The D.C. Circuit in Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 R
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), was one of the first courts to consider an ESA challenge after
Lopez and Morrison, and the two judges writing for the majority projected conflicting ratio-
nales for upholding the ESA.  The court did, however, recognize the commons nature of en-
dangered species when it applied the aggregation doctrine to uphold application of the ESA.
The court stated that “[i]n the aggregate . . . we can be certain that the extinction of species
and the attendant decline in biodiversity will have a real and predictable effect on interstate
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primary purpose of virtually all environmental regulation, to manage how
actors within our environment (appropriators) consume, distribute, conserve,
and utilize resources (air, endangered species, water, minerals, uncontami-
nated land).  Regulating the act of appropriation is necessary because from a
policy perspective dividing the regulation into the constituent sub-elements
of appropriation will result in inefficient and ultimately ineffective regula-
tion.  Since the “object of regulation” of privatized commons resources is
the act of appropriation, which is an economic transaction when implicating
land development or external interstate markets, these acts can be aggregated
for the purpose of finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  This
renders constitutional privatized commons resource regulation by the federal
government under the Commerce Clause.
3. Comprehensive Scheme? A Commons Analysis Better Protects
Federalism Principles
Perhaps the most significant and complex question arising in Com-
merce Clause cases is what is the appropriate balance between federal regu-
latory authority and constitutional federalism principles?  As noted above,
some scholars have argued that Raich stands for the proposition that intra-
state, non-economic activity can be aggregated to meet the substantial effects
test.280  Though this Article challenges that argument, it seems to have
gained some degree of traction in the scholarly community.  As such, it is
necessary to address the implications of this argument for federalism and
how a commons analysis can provide a test that both allows protection of
important environmental resources and avoids endorsing limitless federal
power in violation of constitutional principles of federalism.
The “comprehensive scheme” argument is based largely upon Justice
Scalia’s Raich concurrence and his argument that non-economic activity
could be aggregated if it was “an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated,”281 or if it was “a necessary part of a
more general regulation of interstate commerce.”282  Justice Scalia argued
commerce,” id. at 1053–54, and “we know that in the aggregate the extinction of endangered
species will have a substantial effect on interstate commerce . . . .” Id. at 1053 n.14.  Though
future extinction provides an accurate description of the after-effects on interstate commerce, it
does not necessarily provide sufficient judicial justification for the effects on interstate com-
merce at the time the regulation is enacted and implemented.  A better way to characterize the
point is to recognize that it is the appropriation of endangered species from the collective
privatized environment that is being regulated, and appropriation in the aggregate is what
substantially affects interstate commerce.
280 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13 at 410 (emphasis added) (citing Adler, R
supra note 16, at 764–65; Kmiec, supra note 141, at 98). R
281 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2004) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). See
Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 416 (noting Justice Scalia’s argument that R
“the Lopez decision had ‘implicitly acknowledged’ that ‘Congress’s authority to enact laws
necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed
against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce’”).
282 Raich, 545 U.S. at 37.
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that federalism protections remained since Congress could only reach such
activity “in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market
. . . .”283
Despite Justice Scalia’s arguably oversimplified articulation of a “com-
prehensive scheme” rule that allows regulation of even intrastate non-eco-
nomic activity, it is difficult to imagine how such a rule leaves any room for
constitutional federalism.  As noted by Justice O’Connor’s dissent, the
breadth of such a rule would obliterate federalism protections, since virtually
any non-economic activity could be characterized as part of a broader com-
prehensive economic scheme.284  If the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morri-
son had only been cast in a different light, then under the comprehensive
scheme analysis those regulations would have been upheld.  For example,
Justice O’Connor argued in her Raich dissent that in Lopez:
Congress should have described the relevant crime as “transfer or
possession of a firearm anywhere in the nation” — thus including
commercial and noncommercial activity, and clearly encompass-
ing some activity with assuredly substantial effect on interstate
commerce.  Had it done so . . . we would have sustained its author-
ity to regulate possession of firearms in school zones.  Further-
more, [our] decision suggests we would readily sustain a
congressional decision to attach the regulation of intrastate activity
to a pre-existing comprehensive (or even not-so-comprehensive)
scheme.285
Also, because virtually any activity can be folded within a broader economic
regulatory scheme, Justice O’Connor stated that such a rule “gives Congress
a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Commerce Clause
— nestling questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regu-
latory schemes — rather than with precision.”286  Indeed, some scholars
have predicted that “Raich’s elaboration of the national-regulatory-scheme
principle will invite lower courts to characterize existing statutes that had
previously been thought vulnerable to Commerce Clause challenges as parts
of national regulatory schemes, and hold that Congress may reach all local,
noncommercial activity within the classes of activities covered by those
statutes.”287
283 Id. at 38.
284 Id. at 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
285 Id.  It should be noted that Justice O’Connor attributes this approach to the majority’s
decision, though, as argued above, the majority never held that the intrastate activity could
indeed be non-economic. See supra notes 207–15 and accompanying text. R
286 Raich, 545 U.S. at 43. See also Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review
Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325 (2001).
287 Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 923 (2005). This Author has noted this potential to skirt federal-
ism limitations in other contexts, such as the treaty power.  Blake Hudson, Climate Change,
Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees, 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 363 (2011).
Professor Swaine likewise has noted that “[t]he new federalism decisions also invite fresh
scrutiny of the treaty power by encouraging its creative use to circumvent federalism restric-
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Perhaps the best way to highlight the faulty logic of simultaneously
supporting the circular comprehensive scheme rule (for non-economic activ-
ity) and recognizing any constitutional federalism limitations on Congress’s
power to regulate is the re-characterization of the rule by one scholar as
meaning “the more Congress regulates, the more it can regulate.”288  As
stated by Justice O’Connor, “something more than mere assertion is required
when Congress purports to have power over local activity whose connection
to an interstate market is not self-evident.”289  Such constitutional shortcuts
are obviously problematic and seek to skirt useful distinctions for upholding
federalism protections.  Indeed, the economic/non-economic distinction is
important because requiring that the wholly intrastate activities Congress
seeks to regulate be economic assures that federal regulation is truly aimed
at interstate commerce.290
In the environmental context, and more specifically with regard to the
ESA, for example, scholars have latched upon this potential boon for federal
authority, arguing that the comprehensive scheme rationale would provide a
greater protection for endangered species.291  These scholars have argued that
Raich’s supposed comprehensive scheme holding established that “intrastate
species without a substantial effect on interstate commerce” could be safely
regulated under the ESA.292  Other scholars have asserted that “the compre-
hensive scheme rationale . . . is probably the strongest justification for con-
cluding that the regulation of isolated, economically insignificant
endangered species is constitutional”293 because such regulation is simply a
part of the ESA’s broader scheme for protecting all endangered species.
tions.”  Swaine, supra note 41, at 417. Swaine noted that many scholars argue that VAWA, R
struck down in Morrison, could (and should) be effectively re-enacted if legislated pursuant to
an international treaty. Id. See also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Feder-
alism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100 (2000) (noting that in Morrison “a group of interna-
tional law scholars filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that, even if the statute exceeded
Congress’s powers (as the Supreme Court ultimately concluded), it should be upheld as a valid
implementation of a treaty”); Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars
and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners at 28–30, United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-0005, 99-0029), 1999 WL 1037253, at *28–*30.  Yet it seems clear
there would be no room for federalism at all if the national government could regulate any
activity pursuant to either the Commerce Clause or Treaty Clause.
288 John T. Parry, “Society Must be [Regulated]”: Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause
in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 853, 862 (2005).
289 Raich, 545 U.S. at 52.
290 Barnett, supra note 45, at 748. R
291 Blumm & Kimbrell, Comprehensive Scheme, supra note 46. R
292 Id. at 491 (emphasis added) (referring to Blumm & Kimbrell, Take Provision, supra
note 277). R
293 Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 13, at 391. In full, Mank states that: R
Under the comprehensive scheme rationale that allows Congress to regulate purely
intrastate activities if they are an integral part of a larger regulatory scheme and the
Court’s highly deferential rational basis standard of review in Commerce Clause
cases, if the Supreme Court had addressed the constitutionality of the ESA sometime
between its enactment in 1973 and 1995, the Court almost certainly would have
concluded that Congress had authority under the Clause to enact the ESA even
though some of the species the statute regulates exist in only one state or have little
direct economic significance.
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The commons analysis discussed above, however, demonstrates that
there is no need to go down the path of rendering meaningless the federalism
principles established in the Constitution for the purpose of justifying federal
environmental legislation.  To do so is to stretch unnecessarily the credibility
of environmental protection and to foster greater skepticism among its crit-
ics.  A better approach is to recognize that privatized commons resources
constitute an inherently aggregated economic system, and that a commons
analysis has been built into the “substantial economic effects” test.294  In
addition, the “object of regulation” discussion above demonstrates that be-
cause the act of appropriation of privatized commons resources is an eco-
nomic activity in a finite world dependent on the consumption and
preservation of natural capital, privatized commons resources may be aggre-
gated to meet the substantial economic effects test.  Thus, a commons analy-
sis places endangered species takings by development, for example, within
the economic activity requirement of the substantial effects test.  Commons
analysis also renders it unnecessary to characterize appropriation of natural
capital as non-economic activity rolled into a broader economic scheme,
which would provide no meaningful federalism protections.295
In short, there is no need to go to the extreme of engaging in a bottom-
less comprehensive scheme analysis.  Privatized commons resources, due to
the inherently economic, aggregating effect of commons appropriation, sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.  Acts of appropriation, when aggre-
gated, substantially affect the value, quantity, and quality of natural capital
consumed or preserved elsewhere.  This is sufficient to uphold federal regu-
lation of such resources and at the same time maintain constitutional federal-
ism protections for activities the federal government seeks to regulate that
are not commons, but rather take on the characteristics of, for example, pub-
lic goods.296  Viewing Supreme Court and lower court environmental juris-
prudence through the lens of the commons demonstrates as much.
VI. CONCLUSION
With every ebb and flow of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, oscillat-
ing between federalist and nationalist approaches to the scope of the clause,
scholars express concern over federal environmental regulatory authority.
Yet environmental regulatory authority has survived, with federal courts
content to treat it as fundamentally different from other areas of regulation.
Id. at 391–92.
294 See supra notes 254–55 and accompanying text. R
295 Some scholars have even implicitly argued that commons principles could be used in
determining whether a regulated activity is an essential part of a larger scheme of economic
regulation: “Raich could be construed simply as having adopted a limited ‘fungible goods’
rational for why it is essential to the larger prohibition of a national market in a commodity
that even the local cultivation and possession of such a commodity [sic] also be reached.”
Barnett, supra note 45, at 747. R
296 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. R
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Whether it be the different results reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Lopez/Morrison and Raich, or the Fourth Circuit coming to strikingly diver-
gent conclusions in Gibbs and Brzonkala, courts are determined to treat reg-
ulation of depletable resources subject to non-excludable appropriation
differently than other objects of regulation.  We need to understand why.
Viewing Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the context of natural capi-
tal regulation through the lens of the commons explains and justifies this
distinction.  Courts have consistently upheld federal regulation of privatized
commons resources since the beginning of the modern regulatory state based
upon their aggregated substantial effects on interstate commerce. Raich was
no outlier — it was merely a continuation of precedent in that regard.  Per-
haps Lopez and Morrison were not outliers either, as they did not involve
regulation aimed at commons concerns.  It remains to be seen how the Court
will treat future Commerce Clause challenges to federal environmental and
other statutes.  In the meantime, commons analysis, with its useful descrip-
tions of appropriators, coappropriation, producers, providers, and other con-
cepts, provides important and unified answers to much debated questions
within Commerce Clause jurisprudence, especially regarding the “aggrega-
tion,” “object of regulation,” and “scope of federal authority” questions.
Rather than trying to predict the outcomes of future environmental Com-
merce Clause challenges based upon single cases, scholarly energy would be
better served by recognizing and analyzing the objects of regulation that
have received in the past judicial recognition as a valid subject of federal
regulatory authority — that is, objects of regulation that constitute com-
merce in the commons of the United States.
